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INTRODUCTION
On January 21, 2009, the Minister of Justice of the Palestinian
National Authority ("PNA"), Ali Khashan, faxed a declaration to the
International Criminal Court ("ICC" or "the Court") on behalf of the
* Lecturer and Research Director, International Law, Bynkershoek Institute,
The Hague University, The Hague, The Netherlands; LL.M. (Adv.) in Public
International Law, cum laude, Leiden University, Faculty of Law, Leiden, The
Netherlands; J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology,
Chicago, Illinois; B.A., Modern European History, University of Kansas,
Lawrence, Kansas. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professor John
Dugard and Dr. Michail Vagias for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of
this article.
1153
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
"Government of Palestine" accepting the Court's jurisdiction for an
indefinite period and requesting an investigation into the situation in
Gaza, I under the cited authority of Article 12(3) of the Rome
Statute.2
The PNA's attempt to accede to the ICC's jurisdiction followed
Israel's engagement in armed hostilities with Hamas, a militant
Islamic group based on the Gaza Strip, in late 2008 and early 2009.1
After airstrikes and an Israeli ground invasion, which lasted a total of
three weeks, reports placed Palestinian casualties at approximately
1,300 and Israeli casualties at 10.4 Following the end of hostilities, a
number of UN officials and NGOs called for an investigation into
1. See Declaration Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court from Ali Khashan, Minister of Justice, Palestinian Nat'l Auth., to the ICC
Registrar (Jan. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Palestinian Declaration], available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/74EEE20 I -OFED-4481-95D4-
C8071087102C/279777/20090122PalestinianDeclaration2.pdf. The declaration
purported to be retroactively valid from July 1, 2002. Id. The next day, the
Minister hand delivered the declaration to the Prosecutor. See Int'l Crim. Court,
Office of the Prosecutor, Visit of the Minister ofJustice of the Palestinian National
Authority, Mr. Ali Khashan, to the ICC (22 January 2009) (Feb. 6, 2009),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/4CCO8515-DOBA-454D-A594-
446F30289EF2/280869/PNAMFA l 30209.pdf. Interestingly, the Registrar
confirmed receipt of the declaration in a communication addressed to the PNA, not
the "Government of Palestine." Letter from Silvana Arbia, Registrar, Int'l Crim.
Court, to Ali Khashan, Minister of Justice, Palestinian Nat'l Auth. (Jan. 23, 2009)
[hereinafter Letter from Silvana Arbia], available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/74EEE201 -OFED-4481-95D4-
C8071087102C/279778/20090123404SALASS2.pdf.
2. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12(3), July 17,
1998, 2187 UNT.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (outlining a special procedure
by which a "state" not party to the Rome Statute may accept the jurisdiction of the
ICC by lodging a declaration with the Registrar of the Court). The ICC specified
that the Court Registrar accepted Palestine's declaration "without prejudice to a
judicial determination on the applicability of article 12(3)" in light of "the
uncertainties of the international community with respect to the existence or non-
existence of a State of Palestine," Int'l Crim. Court, Report on the Activities of the
Court, para. 61, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/8/40 (Oct. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Report on
the Activities of the Court].
3. See Isabel Kershner & Taghreed El-Khodary, Israeli Troops Launch Attack
on Gaza, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/world/
middleeast/04mideast.html (reporting that Israel's primary goal in attacking Gaza
was to destroy the infrastructure of Hamas, including sites used to launch rockets
at southern Israel).
4. Israel Hits Hamas Targets in Gaza, BBC NEWS (Feb. 1, 2009),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7863500.stm.
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war crimes perpetrated by both sides in the course of the attacks,
though the focus was largely on Israel, possibly due to the
disproportionate number of causalities suffered by Palestinians.
There are accusations that the Israeli Defense Force ("IDF") targeted
civilians and non-military objects, including a UN school and
headquarters, utilized banned weapons, such as white phosphorus,
and otherwise used force out of proportion with the military
objectives. 6 In fact, Ehud Olmert pledged a "harsh and
disproportionate" response to rocket attacks from Gaza, suggesting
that Israel intended to use excessive force.' Reports published by
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the UN Fact
Finding Mission, as well as an investigation by the Arab League,
have all concluded that Israel likely violated the laws of war and that
Israeli officials may have committed war crimes.' Importantly, these
5. See, e.g., Chris McGreal, Demands Grow for Gaza War Crimes
Investigation, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 13, 2009, http://guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/
13/gaza-israel-war-crimes (indicating that the International Red Cross, Human
Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and local human rights organizations joined
the United Nations in calling for an investigation into evidence of war crimes
committed by Israel); Fida Qishta & Peter Beaumont, Israel Accused of War
Crimes Over 12-Hour Assault on Gaza Village, THE OBSERVER, Jan. 18, 2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/18/israel-war-crimes-gaza-conflict
(noting that B'Tselem, an Israeli human rights organization, raised concerns over
Israeli abuses in the village of Khuza'a).
6. See Marlise Simons, Palestinians Press for War Crimes Inquiry on Gaza,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2009, http://www.nytimes.comi/2009/02/1/world/middleeast/
11 hague.html. The Israeli military was also accused of attacking medical facilities
and holding Palestinian families as human shields. See McGreal, supra note 5.
7. See James Hider, Israel: Hardline Nationalists Savour Pre-election Boost
in Polls, THE TIMES ONLINE (Feb. 2, 2009), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/
tol/news/world/middle east/article5636047.ece; Israel Hits Hamas Targets in
Gaza, supra note 4 (quoting Ehud Olmert); see also Brian Klug, A Catastrophic
Turn of Phrase: What Did the Israeli Minister Mean When He Talked of a 'Shoah'
Befalling the Palestinians in Gaza?, THE GUARDIAN, (Feb. 29, 2008),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/feb/29/acatastrophicturnofphrase
(publishing a statement by Israeli Deputy Defense Minister, Matan Vilnai, warning
that rocket attacks from Gaza will provoke a harsh response by Israel). The Israeli
Deputy Defense Minister stated that "[Hamas] will bring upon [itself] a bigger
shoah because [Israel] will use all [its] might to defend [itself]." Id. Historically,
"shoah" meant "catastrophe or disaster," but in recent years, "the term acquired a
more specific meaning and an intense emotional charge," because of its use in
reference to the Nazi Holocaust. Id.
8. See generally AMNESTY INT'L, ISRAEL/GAZA OPERATION 'CAST LEAD': 22




reports and investigations also concluded that the rocket attacks by
Hamas militants probably violated international criminal law. 9 If
these findings are true, Israel and Hamas may be held liable for
international crimes as well as for violating provisions of the Fourth
Geneva Convention that prohibit disproportionate military attacks,
the targeting of civilians, and the enforcement of collective
punishment.1"
Calls for investigation and possible prosecution are difficult
because it is unclear which actor can and should assert jurisdiction.
Israel likely has criminal jurisdiction over IDF members with regard
to crimes committed in Gaza."I The PNA may also have jurisdiction
since its territory and "nationals" were both attackers and subjects of
attack, though there may be constraints on its capacity or ability to
prosecute. Furthermore, if these acts rise to the level of certain
international crimes for which universal jurisdiction may be invoked
0563725e633a/mdel50152009en.pdf (documenting Israel's possible violation of
international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and international
criminal law based on its actions in Gaza); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PRECISELY
WRONG: GAZA CIVILIANS KILLED BY ISRAELI DRONE-LAUNCHED MISSILES 4 (June
30, 2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iopt0
609webwcoverO.pdf (concluding that Israel's "fail[ure] to take all feasible
precautions to verify that the targets were combatants" constitutes a violation of
the laws of war); UN Human Rights Council, Human Rights in Palestine and Other
Occupied Arab Territories: Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on
the Gaza Conflict, 1715-33, UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (2009) (Richard Goldstone
et al.) [hereinafter Goldstone Report] (summarizing legal findings regarding
Israel's military operations in Gaza from December 27, 2008 to January 18, 2009);
REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT FACT FINDING COMMITTEE ON GAZA: NO SAFE
PLACE para. 572-73 (Apr. 30, 2009) (presented to the League of Arab States),
available at http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/picturegallery/reportfull
FINAL.pdf (reiterating that both individual members of IDF and the Israeli state
committed war crimes in Gaza).
9. See Goldstone Report, supra note 8, 1747-50; REPORT OF THE
INDEPENDENT FACT FINDING COMMITTEE ON GAZA: NO SAFE PLACE, supra note 8,
para. 574-577.
10. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War arts. 3, 4, 33, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention IV]; see also REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT FACT FINDING COMMITTEE
ON GAZA: No SAFE PLACE, supra note 8, para. 530-71, 607 (exploring also
whether Israel's actions in Gaza might violate the 1948 Genocide Convention).
11. Israel's authority to prosecute members of its own armed forces for their
actions in Gaza is supported by the customary law principles of active nationality
and territorial jurisdiction. See REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT FACT FINDING
COMMITTEE ON GAZA: No SAFE PLACE, supra note 8, para. 578.
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then any state may prosecute the alleged criminals.12 Given the long
standing animosity between Israel and Palestine, however, it seems
unlikely that either party could accept the other's assertion of
jurisdiction, investigation, or criminal prosecution as unbiased and
legitimate." An assertion of universal jurisdiction by a third state
would be equally problematic, as many states are perceived as
having clear political preferences in the Palestinian situation. These
considerations have given rise to calls for a truly neutral international
tribunal or commission, such as the ICC, to take jurisdiction over the
dispute. 4
From the very beginning, the Palestinian declaration sparked a
public debate over whether Palestine constitutes a "state" for the
purposes of ICC jurisdiction." Since then, the Prosecutor of the ICC,
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, has received hundreds of requests to
investigate allegations in Gaza. 16 The Prosecutor is currently
12. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME
OF CRIMES 354-55 (2000) (discussing the specific crimes for which universal
jurisdiction may be invoked by any state regardless of whether that state has a
territorial relationship to the crime or alleged criminal).
13. See Israel: Military Investigations Fail Gaza War Victims, HUM. RIGHTS
WATCH (Feb. 7, 2010), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/02/06/israel-military-
investigations-fail-gaza-war-victims (explaining that both Israeli and Hamas
authorities failed to conduct impartial investigations); see also Gaza: Hamas
Report Whitewashes Crimes, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 28, 2010),
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/01/28/gaza-hamas-report-whitewashes-war-
crimes (highlighting Hamas's inability to conduct a legally and factually accurate
self-assessment of its attacks against Israel),
14. See Goldstone Report, supra note 8, TT 1760, 1763 (noting that resorting to
international justice mechanisms is appropriate "where domestic authorities are
unable or unwilling to comply with" their legal obligations "to investigate
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law," and considering
that the violations committed in Gaza fall within the subject-matter jurisdiction of
the ICC).
15. Compare John Dugard, Op-Ed., Take the Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/opinion/23iht-eddugard.html (contending that
the ICC prosecutor should adopt an expansive approach to statehood
determination, and that under such an approach, Palestine qualifies as a state for
the purpose of the Court), with George P. Fletcher, Op-Ed., Don't Go There, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/opinion/23iht-
edfletcher.html (arguing that only "full-blooded states" can accept the jurisdiction
of the ICC under the Rome Statute, and asserting that Palestine is "[no]where near
the status of a state").
16. See Int'l Crim. Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in Palestine:
Summary of Submissions on Whether the Declaration Lodged by the Palestinian
2011] 1157
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considering whether Khashan's acceptance of jurisdiction can be
honored, and if so, whether the Prosecutor would accordingly have
jurisdiction to investigate. 17 To that effect, the Prosecutor is also
proceeding with a preliminary investigation to ascertain whether the
alleged crimes fall within the Court's subject matter jurisdiction.II It
appears that Khashan's declaration constitutes acceptance of the
Court's jurisdiction for events falling within the designated time
period rather than an attempt to permanently join the ICC. This paper
argues that Palestine may accept the Court's jurisdiction, in part
because Palestine could accede to the Rome Statute as a state party.
I. THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ROME STATUTE
The ICC is an international organization with legal personality
separate from the United Nations. 19 The Court's subject matter
jurisdiction is limited to crimes of genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression,20 which have been
committed since the Rome Statute entered into force on July 1,
2002. 21 The ICC can only exercise its jurisdiction over crimes
committed within the territory, or by a national, of States Parties to
the Rome Statute, 22 unless a non-state party accepts the Court's
National Authority Meets Statutory Requirements, para. 12 (May 3, 2010),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D3C77FA6-9DEE-45B 1 -ACCO-
B41706BB41E5/281989/PALESTINEFINAL2_2_.pdf [hereinafter Summary of
Submissions on Palestine] (reporting that, as of May 2010, the ICC Prosecutor
received 388 communications relating to "alleged crimes committed in Gaza
between December 2008 and January 2009"). The Prosecutor has also received
numerous submissions arguing in favor or against the ability of the ICC to exercise
jurisdiction based on the declaration by the PNA. See id
17. See Sebastian Rotella, International Criminal Court to Consider Gaza
Investigation, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/05/
world/fg-court-palestinians5. In addition, the Prosecutor may certainly exercise
jurisdiction over any Israeli or Palestinian who also has the nationality of a State
Party to the Rome Statute. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 12(2)(b). This
alternative basis for jurisdiction appears to be the most likely strategy for the
Prosecutor to exercise jurisdiction over Gaza in the near future.
18. See Report on the Activities of the Court, supra note 2, para. 61.
19. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 2, 4(1) (acknowledging that the ICC
has a relationship with the UN but also maintains its own legal personality).
20. Id. art. 5(1). But see id. art. 5(2) (suspending the ICC's jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression until the crime is defined).
21. Id. art. 11(1).
22. Id. art. 12(2).
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jurisdiction with respect to a particular crime. 23 Further, the ICC's
jurisdiction only extends to designated crimes that are committed
after the state has become party to the Rome Statute, unless the state
consents to an earlier date, not to precede the entry into force of the
Statute generally. 24 In addition, the ICC is complementary in the
sense that it can only assert its jurisdiction when a situation has been
referred to it by a State Party or the UN Security Council, or when
the ICC Prosecutor initiates an investigation on his or her own
accord.25 Similarly, cases will only be admissible where a state with
jurisdiction over a particular crime is itself "unwilling or unable to
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution."26
The Rome Statute provides that it is open for ratification by any of
the original States Parties to its negotiation and is also "open to
accession by all States." 27 Throughout the Rome Statute, reference is
made to "States" or "States Parties", without providing a specific
definition for purposes of the statute. 28 Alternatively, the Rome
Statute provides that non-members of the ICC may accept the
jurisdiction of the Court on a case-by-case basis.2 9 To date, C~te
d'Ivoire is the only state to accept this case-specific jurisdiction.3 0 In
23. Id. art. 12(3).
24. Id. art. 11(2).
25. Id. arts. 13-15. The hundreds of communications received with respect to
the situation in Gaza constitute requests for the Prosecutor to exercise powers
under Article 15. See id. art. 15 (delineating the Prosecutor's power to begin
investigations on his own initiative, which includes the power to seek additional
information from states, the United Nations, NGOs, and "other reliable sources").
26. Id. art. 17(1)(a); see also id. art. 17(1)(b)-(d) (requiring the ICC to find a
case inadmissible where the case has already been investigated by a state with
jurisdiction, and the state made a genuine decision not to prosecute; where the
accused has already been subject to prosecution; or where "the case is not of
sufficient gravity" to warrant "further action by the Court").
27. Id. art. 125(1), (3).
28. See, e.g., id. arts. 4(2), 9(1), 9(2), 11(2), 12(1), 12(3), 13(a), 14, 17(1)(a)-
(b), 18.
29. Id. art. 12(3).
30. See Press Release, Int'l Crim. Court, Registrar Confirms that Republic of
Cote d'lvoire has Accepted the Jurisdiction of the Court (Feb. 15, 2005), available
at http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Press+and+Media/Press+Releases/2005/
(follow link with article title); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "BECAUSE THEY
HAVE THE GUNS . . . I'M LEFT WITH NOTHING": THE PRICE OF CONTINUING
IMPUNITY IN C6TE D' IVOIRE 31 (May 2006), available at http://www.hrw.org/
sites/default/files/reports/cotedivoire0506webwcover.pdf (lamenting that the ICC
Prosecutor had yet to send an investigative delegation to the C6te d'lvoire more
2011] 1159
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such alternative jurisdiction situations, the language of the Rome
Statute appears to require that the entity accepting jurisdiction be a
"State." 1' Indeed, many have argued that Palestine can neither
become a member nor accept the jurisdiction of the Court because it
lacks statehood.3 2 This conclusion is not so easy.
II. PALESTINIAN QUALIFICATIONS
For the purpose of analyzing whether Palestine fulfills the
requirements of statehood under international law, an important
initial observation is that three entities currently represent Palestine:
the people of Palestine," the Palestinian Liberation Organization
than two years after the state accepted the ICC's jurisdiction); Cte d'Ivoire: Pro-
Gbagbo Forces Abducting Opponents, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 23, 2010),
http://www.hrw.org/node/95212 (reporting the ICC Prosecutor's threat to initiate
an investigation should post-election violence turn deadly).
31. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 12(3) ("If the acceptance of a State
which is not a Party to this Statute is required . . . , that State may . . . accept the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in question. The
accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without any delay or exception ...
") (emphasis added).
32. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 15 (arguing that statehood must be a
precondition to acceptance of the ICC's jurisdiction under article 12(3) of the
Rome Statute because otherwise non-state groups can use the procedure to
embarrass or threaten states without opening themselves up to reciprocal scrutiny).
See generally Mala Tabory, The Legal Personality of the Palestinian Autonomy, in
NEW POLITICAL ENTITIES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE PALESTINIAN ENTITY 139-52 (Amos Shapira & Mala
Tabory eds., 1999) (concluding that Palestinian Autonomy in Gaza lacks
international legal personality, and should be classified as a "non-State entity," in
that it does not have "legal capacity to act and to enter into agreements" beyond
the specifications of the its constitutive instruments); Daniel Benoliel & Ronen
Perry, Israel, Palestine and the ICC, 32 MICH. J. INT'L L. 73, 125-26 (2010)
(arguing that the Rome Statute guarantees a "state-based system," and dismissing
six different "theoretical and practical" arguments for recognizing a Palestinian
state); Confidential Communication Regarding the Palestinian Declaration and
ICC Jurisdiction from Dave Davenport et al., to Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor,
Int'l Crim. Court 8-14 (Nov. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Davenport Communication],
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NRlrdonlyres/D3C77FA6-9DEE-45Bl-ACCO-
B41706BB41E5/281873/Paldeclandiccjurisd.pdf (arguing that Palestine is not a
state under "broad principles of international law" or, in the alternative, that the
PNA has failed to establish territorial jurisdiction in the criminal law context and,
therefore, cannot delegate jurisdiction to the ICC).
33. Cf Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, 101-09
(July 22) (distinguishing between the identity of the Government of Kosovo and
1160 [26:5
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("PLO"), and the PNA. First, both the League of Nations and the
United Nations have recognized that the people of Palestine have the
right to self-determination under international law. 34 The PLO
represents the Palestinian people at the international level, including
by controlling the observer seat for "Palestine" at the United
Nations." The PNA was created by the Oslo Accords, an agreement
concluded between Israel and the PLO. 36 In the Accords and
subsequent interim agreements, the parties agreed that the PNA
would incrementally obtain jurisdiction over the West Bank and
Gaza, and that the Palestinian people could establish a permanent
the competent representatives of the people of Kosovo for purposes of the
declaration of independence, and concluding that the declaration was made by the
latter even though the representatives were largely the same individuals as those
serving in the Government).
34. See League of Nations Covenant art. 22 (declaring that "certain
communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire" could be provisionally
recognized as an independent nations, "subject to the rendering of administrative
advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand
alone"); see also John Quigley, The Palestine Declaration to the International
Criminal Court: The Statehood Issue, 35 RUTGERS L. REc. 1, 8-9 (2009) (arguing
that "Palestine became an international entity upon the demise of the Ottoman
Empire in the wake of War World I," as a result of the mandate system
implemented by the League of Nations, under which Palestine was to eventually
gain independence). But see Robert Weston Ash, Is Palestine a "State"? A
Response to Professor John Quigley's Article "The Palestine Declaration to the
International Criminal Court: The Statehood Issue", 36 RUTGERS L. REC. 186,
197-98 (2009) (countering Quigley's contention that the mandate system gave
Arab Palestinians exclusive claim to the Gaza territory by pointing out that the
grant of sovereignty to the "Palestinian people" could include both Jews and
Arabs). In 1974, the UN General Assembly again resolved the "Question of
Palestine" in favor of the rights of the Palestinian people to "self-determination"
and "national independence and sovereignty." G.A. Res. 3236, UN GAOR, 29th
Sess., Supp. No. 31, 1, UN Doc. A/9361, at 4 (Nov. 22, 1974).
35. G.A. Res. 3237, UN GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, 1, UN Doc.
A/936 1, at 4 (Nov. 22, 1974); see also United States v. Palestinian Liberation Org.,
695 F. Supp. 1456, 1471 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding that the U.S. Anti-Terrorism
Act neither required cancellation of the PLO's observer status at the UN nor
allowed the U.S. government to interfere with that status); Applicability of the
Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters
Agreement of 26 June 1947, Advisory Opinion, 1988 I.C.J. 12, TT 57-58 (Apr. 26)
(holding that the U.S. was bound by an arbitration clause in an agreement with the
UN and was thus required to arbitrate a dispute involving its attempt to close the
PLO Mission in New York through anti-terrorism laws).
36. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self Government Arrangements, Isr.-
PLO, Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1525 [hereinafter Oslo Accords].
2011] 1161
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settlement following a transition period and negotiations." While the
PNA is responsible for local governmental functions, Israel and the
PLO, in connection with the Accords, exchanged letters wherein
Israel recognized "the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian
people," at least for the purpose of negotiating peace in the Middle
East."
A. STATEHOOD
The question of whether an entity claiming to be a state is indeed a
state is a classic problem of public international law; this analysis
resists easy and conclusive determination, especially in questionable
cases such as Palestine.39 Most readers will be familiar with the
competing constitutive and declaratory theories of statehood.40 In
37. See Wye River Memorandum (Interim Agreement), Isr.-PLO, Oct. 23,
1998, 37 I.L.M. 1251 [hereinafter Wye River Memorandum] (outlining actions
required to fully implement the Interim Agreement); Interim Agreement on the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Isr.-PLO, Sept. 28, 1995, art. 17, 1, 8, UN Doc.
A/51/889, S/1997/357 [hereinafter Interim Agreement]; Oslo Accords, supra note
36, art. 1 (establishing "a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority ... for
the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional
period not exceeding five years . . . ."). Clearly, a permanent Palestinian settlement
has yet to come.
38. See Letter from Yasir Arafat, Chairman, Palestinian Liberation Org., to
Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister, Israel (Sept. 1993), reprinted in 7 PALESTINIAN
Y.B. INT'L L. 230 (1992-94); see also Michael Kearney & Stijn Denayer, Al-Haq
Position Paper on Issues Arising frorn the Palestinian Authority's Submission of a
Declaration to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court under Article
12(3) of the Rome Statute para. 26 (Al Haq, 2009), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D3C77FA6-9DEE-45B 1 -ACCO-
B41706BB4 1 E5/281874/OTPAlHaqpositionpapericc 1 4December2009.pdf
(comparing the responsibilities of the PNA and PLO and noting, inter alia, that the
PLO has the capacity to "conduct negotiations and sign economic agreements 'for
the benefit of" the PNA).
39. See, e.g., Davenport Communication, supra note 32 (acknowledging that
the PNA may fulfill some statehood criteria, but ultimately concluding that
Palestine is not a state and cannot become one until all criteria are satisfied). This
assertion overlooks the considerable state practice cited herein that adopts a middle
ground. Furthermore, it also contradicts Davenport's acknowledgment in the same
communication that international law has no universally accepted definition of
statehood. See id at 8. This appears to contradict his confident conclusion
elsewhere
40. Under the constitutive theory, the recognition of a new state by other
established states is a requirement for statehood. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE
CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 19-22 (2d ed. 2006). The
declaratory theory of statehood considers recognition of a new state by other states
[ 26:51162
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contemporary scholarship, the prevailing view is that recognition of a
new state by other states "does not bring into legal existence a state
which did not exist before;" rather, statehood can only be established
by the satisfaction of objective criteria. 41 Nevertheless, the
constitutive theory is sometimes applied in practice,4 2 or at the very
least, the recognition of new states occasionally has constitutive
effects.4 3 This article will not conclude in favor of either theory, as
as a mere "political act" rather than as a pre-condition to achieving statehood. Id. at
22-26.
41. J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 139 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963);
see, e.g., Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 1, fJ 91,
94, 95 (Feb. 26) (evaluating the history of UN membership status of the entities
that were part of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("SFRY") in
light of its dissolution and subsequent loss of UN membership, and concluding that
the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("fRY") was permitted to participate at
the United Nations until it reapplied for membership); Conference on Yugoslavia,
Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 1, para. 1, 31 I.L.M. 1494, 1495 (1992)
(affirming the commission's position that recognition of new states by other states
is declaratory and discussing elements of statehood); Conference on Yugoslavia,
Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 10, para. 4-5, 31 I.L.M. 1526 (1992)
(finding that the new FRY obtained statehood status under international law
regardless of whether other states recognized it as a state because "recognition [is
a] purely declaratory [and] discretionary act"). See generally M.J. PETERSON,
RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS: LEGAL DOCTRINE AND STATE PRACTICE, 1815-
1995 (1997) (providing a detailed explanation of the practice of recognition of
governments, including the impact of recognition on statehood determinations and
limits to recognition).
42. Prosecutor v. Delalid, Case No. IT-96-21-T, 105-108 Judgment (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998) (describing the emergence
of new states following dissolution of the SFRY, including recognition of certain
states by the European Community); see also Martti Koskenniemi, The Place of
Law in Collective Security, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 455, 469 n.54 (1996)
(commenting that Europe followed a constitutive approach in dealing with the
states emerging from the SFRY in that it chose to recognize democratic states that
complied with the European ideal of guaranteeing protection to minorities). See
generally Alexandros Yannis, The Concept of Suspended Sovereignty in
International Law and Its Implications in International Politics, 13 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 1037-52 (2002) (noting the emergence of the concept of "suspended
sovereignty" to situations in which states continue to recognize the statehood of
another state under occupation that has no factual existence).
43. See CRAWFORD, supra note 40, at 24 (suggesting that "the actual practice
of States respecting the dissolution of Yugoslavia may have been constitutive in
effect"); JORRI DUURSMA, FRAGMENTATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
OF MICRO-STATES: SELF DETERMINATION AND STATEHOOD 142 (1996) (arguing
that recognition and admission by the United Nations may have had constitutive
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the following argument in favor of Palestinian statehood does not
ultimately hinge on this distinction.44
The statehood analysis traditionally begins with the Convention on
Rights and Duties of States ("Montevideo Convention"), which
established the objective criteria required for statehood including: a
permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the
capacity to act in the international realm. 45 The additional or
substitute criteria of "independence" is often asserted as well.4 6 In the
case of Palestine, both territory and population appear to be satisfied.
Although Palestine's external borders are not entirely clear, perfectly
fixed borders may not be a hard requirement for statehood, as
evidenced by Israel's designation as a state despite its unclear
borders. The requirements of government and capacity to enter into
international relations will be addressed separately.
Practitioners and scholars have proposed a range of additional
criteria for statehood beyond those identified in the Montevideo
Convention. For example, one consideration is whether the opinion
of the state in question is relevant for the purposes of statehood
determination.4 7 In the case of Palestine, some authors have construed
effects for certain European microstates); Matthew C. R. Craven, The European
Community Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia, 66 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1995
373, 375 (1996) (observing that international recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Croatia was "highly 'constitutive'); see also A.V. Lowe & Colin Warbrick,
Current Developments: Public International Law: Recognition of States, 41 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 473, 480 (1992) (explaining that "reliance on recognition as some
kind of constitutive devise" gave other states a voice in the Yugoslavia situation by
raising the issue of minority rights as related to the constitution of borders, a
criteria not traditionally considered in statehood determinations).
44. For an argument that all acts of recognition embrace both theories to
varying degrees, see generally William Thomas Worster, Law, Politics, and the
Conception of the State in State Recognition Theory, 27 B.U. INT'L L.J. 115
(2009).
45. Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 165
L.N.T.S 19 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention].
46. See Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (1928)
("Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein,
to the exclusion of any other state, the functions of a state."); James Crawford, The
Creation of the State of Palestine: Too Much Too Soon?, 1 EUR. J. INT'L L. 307,
309 (1990) (contending that "state independence" should be the focus of statehood
determinations, and pointing out that the concept embodies the territorial and self-
governing elements established in the Montevideo Convention).
47. See, e.g., Yal Ronen, Entities that Can Be States But Do Not Claim to Be
(Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem, Research Paper No. 06-10, 2011), available at
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the statements of Palestinian authorities as admissions that Palestine
is not a state, in spite of the fact that the state's position on the matter
constitutes a subjective belief rather than an objective criterion.4 8 A
similar argument has been made in the case of Taiwan. 49 The
Palestinian statements on which these authors rely are, however, less
clear than they submit. For example, the authors base their argument
on statements by Palestinian authorities referencing "the
establishment of an independent Palestinian state" in the future. so
These types of statements could equally reflect Palestine's
acknowledgement that it needs to secure long-term economic
viability, independence from military occupation, and declaratory
recognition of its statehood. 1 Further, given the necessity for
cautious diplomacy in the Israel-Palestine conflict, the position of the
PNA on Palestinian statehood is probably deliberately vague.
It has also been argued, both in the Palestine situation and in the
ICJ's advisory opinion on Kosovo,5 2 that recognizing certain entities
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1926421.
48. See, e.g., Legal Memorandum in Opposition to the Palestinian Authority's
January 2009 Attempt to Accede to ICC Jurisdiction Over Alleged Acts
Committed on Palestinian Territory Since 1 July 2001 from Grigor Puppinck et al.
to Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, Int'l Crim. Court, 12-15 (Eur. Ctr. L. &
Justice, Sept. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Puppinck Memorandum], available at
http://www.ice-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D3C77FA6-9DEE-45Bl-ACCO-B41706BB4
1E5/281869/OTPlegalmemoranduml.pdf.
49. See CRAWFORD, supra note 40, at 206-21 (discussing the legal status of
Taiwan under international law and concluding that Taiwan is "not a State because
it has not unequivocally asserted its separation from China and is not recognized as
a State distinct from China"). This conclusion is rather absolute, however, and
overlooks the likelihood that Taiwan, like Palestine, used purposefully vague
language regarding its intent in light of the very real risk that the People's Republic
of China would impose sanctions against it. See Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal
Supreme Court] Sept. 9, 2010, Case No. 5A_329/2009 ) (Switz.) (evidencing that
Taiwan regards itself as a state for the purposes of inclusion in the International
Organization for Standardization country name list); see also CRAWFORD, supra
note 40, at 216-18 (discussing Taiwan's ambiguous statements in 1999 regarding a
unitary China as signifying Taiwan's hesitance to speak plainly regarding its desire
for formal separation in light of threatened sanctions).
50. See Puppinck Memorandum, supra note 48, at 12-15.
51. See, e.g., Application of Palestine for Admission to Membership in the
United Nations, UN Doc. A/66/371, S/2011/592 (Sept. 23, 2011) (referring
repeatedly to the already existing "State of Palestine," and signed by Abbas in his
purported capacity as "President of the State of Palestine").
52. See generally Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral
Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, supra note 33Error!
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as states presents a slippery slope problem. The argument's logic is
that recognizing an entity or ethnic minority opens the door for other
similarly situated groups to seek recognition, thereby undermining
the stability of the entire inter-state system. 5 It is far from clear that
allowing the handful of entities that currently remain outside the
state-based system to join the system on equal terms would
necessarily result in a catastrophic, domino collapse of the entire
state system, especially in light of the principle of territorial integrity.
Moreover, even if recognizing those entities as states resulted in such
a collapse, it is similarly uncertain whether international law would
consider this policy concern to be relevant in the statehood analysis.
B. GOVERNMENT
Two of the objective Montevideo criteria-the existence of a
government and the capacity for international relations-demand
more detailed consideration in a discussion about the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. This article argues that the PNA has constituted
a government for the purposes of establishing Palestinian statehood
sihce the conclusion of the Oslo Accords, and that Palestine's
capacity to act internationally, though limited, is also sufficient for
the purposes of accepting the ICC's jurisdiction.
Prior to the Oslo Accords, Israel occupied the Palestinian territory
and exercised government functions. Then, as stated previously, the
PNA was established pursuant to the Oslo Accords, as an
autonomous sub-organ of the PLO.54 In the Accords and subsequent
interim agreements, Israel consented to implementation of Security
Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which included the transfer of
Bookmark not defined., 122 (entertaining arguments against Kosovo's
unilateral declaration of independence, but ultimately concluding that "the
adoption of [the February 2008] declaration did not violate any applicable rule of
international law").
53. See e.g. Letter from Gregor Puppink. Ctr. Euro. L. & Justice, to Luis
Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, Int'l Crim. Ct (Sept. 9, 2009) available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D3C77FA6-9DEE-45B l-ACCO-
B41706BB41E5/281869/OTPlegalmemoranduml.pdf (warning-in colorful
terms-that the ICC's extension of jurisdiction to Palestine "could open a
Pandora's Box," and consequently "lead[] to a flood of similar declarations by
non-state entities, thereby diluting the effectiveness of the Court and disrupting its
activities").
54. See, e.g., Oslo Accords, supra note 36, art. I.
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jurisdiction over the West Bank and Gaza to the newly created PNA
for a transitional period of five years followed by a permanent
settlement." Both Israel and the PLO agreed that the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip would be considered "a single territorial unit,"5 6 over
which the PNA would have sole jurisdiction.
The Accords and subsequent interim agreements provided that the
PNA would have broad legislative, executive, and judicial
authority," which would extend to "education and culture, health,
social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism." 59 In addition, the
agreements specified that the PNA would operate its own police
force.60 These agreements also stipulated that Israel could continue to
exercise "powers and responsibilities not transferred to the [PNA],"
notwithstanding their military's withdrawal from the West Bank and
Gaza .6' Israel specifically reserved that it "will continue to be
responsible for external security, and for internal security and public
order of settlements and Israelis." 62
With regards to foreign relations, Israel and the PLO agreed that
the PNA "will not have powers and responsibilities in the sphere of
foreign relations, which sphere includes the establishment abroad of
embassies, consulates or other types of foreign missions . . . , the
appointment of or admission of diplomatic and consular staff, and
the exercise of diplomatic functions." 63 Under the agreements,
however, the PLO was permitted to conclude international
agreements with states or international organizations "for the benefit
of the [PNA],"" in narrow circumstances related to economic and
55. Id arts. I, VI.
56. See id. art. IV; Interim Agreement, supra note 377, art. XVII(1).
57. Interim Agreement, supra note 37, art. XVII(2)(a).
58. Id. arts. IX (1), (6); id. art. XVII(3).
59. See Oslo Accords, supra note 36, art. VI(2).
60. Id. art. VI(2); see also Wye River Memorandum, supra note 377, § II(C)(1)
(setting forth rules to ensure that the Palestinian police force complies with the
agreements between Palestine and Israel).
61. Interim Agreement, supra note 37, art. 1(5); see also id. art. XVII(l)(a)-(b)
(excluding from the PNA's jurisdiction "issues that will be negotiated in the
permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, specified military locations,
Palestinian refugees, borders, foreign relations and Israelis" as well as any other
powers not expressly transferred to the PNA).
62. See Interim Agreement, supra note 37, arts. IX(2), XII(l).
63. Id. art. IX(5)(a).
64. Id. art. IX (5)(b); see also id. art. IX (5)(c) (clarifying that the PNA's
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cultural development goals. 65
While dissenters make much of these limitations, 6 overall, the
competencies transferred to the PNA permit the conclusion that
Palestine has a government. Under the Accords and related
agreements, the PNA is responsible for two of the most fundamental
government services: a judiciary and a police force. 67 As for external
security and diplomatic relations, international law does not
necessarily require that an entity exercise these powers in order to
satisfy the governmental criterion. Several small states, such as
Liechtenstein, Monaco, and San Marino, which are widely regarded
as states, do not substantively exercise powers of external security
and diplomatic relations, yet their institutions satisfy the
governmental criterion. Even without the microstate example, the
PLO is capable of undertaking some international relations, a point
discussed in greater depth below. 68 The fact that Palestine's
governing bodies have limited powers and a potentially fractured
existence does not mean that it is not a government and cannot
satisfy this criterion for the purpose of establishing its statehood.
C. CAPACITY TO ACT INTERNATIONALLY
The criterion of capacity to act internationally demands further
discussion. To begin, scholars debate whether such capacity is, in
dealings with foreign states and international organizations "shall not be
considered foreign relations" if conducted for the purpose of implementing the
Oslo Accords and subsequent agreements).
65. Id. art. IX (5)(b).
66. See e.g. Legal Opinion of Malcolm Shaw, In the Matter of the Jurisdiction
of the International Criminal Court with Regard to the Declaration of Palestinian
Authority from Alex Herman to Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, Int'l Crim.
Court (Int'l Assoc. Jewish Lawyers & Jurists, Sept. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Shaw
Opinion], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D3C77FA6-9DEE-
45B 1 -ACCO-
B41706BB41 E5/281883/OTP2009000036046Informationreceivedfromlntemation.
pdf (contending that the transfer of limited powers to the PNA is not sufficient to
establish the independence of the PNA for purposes of statehood, but failing to
identify which powers are essential for a government to have and failing to
consider that the transfer of powers from an occupying force to a people with the
right to self-determination does limit the people from exercising other powers).
67. See Oslo Accords, supra note 36, art. VIII; Interim Agreement, supra note
37, art. IX(6). But see Davenport Communication, supra note 32, at 11 (pointing
out that Hamas has attempted to "hijack" the Palestinian court system).
68. See infra Part III(C).
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fact, a consequence of statehood, rather than a criterion.69 If that is
the case, then capacity to act internationally is evidence of statehood,
rather than a criterion. This argument will not be addressed directly
here since in either case, capacity to act internationally is significant
for statehood. This section explores the ways in which Palestine has
acted internationally. While these manifestations constitute evidence
of statehood, this author ultimately concludes that Palestine's
inconsistent capacity to act internationally does not rise to the level
enjoyed by other states.
The entity that purports to be the "Arab State of Palestine" in fact
declared itself to be a state in 1988, though that declaration may be
somewhat lacking in content.7 0 This declaration of statehood has
been recognized by approximately ninety-seven states, including
many Arab, African, and Eastern European states, but also by such
significant world powers as Russia, China, India, and Indonesia,"
two of which sit as permanent members on the UN Security Council.
All of Palestine's neighbors, except Israel, have recognized its
statehood.72 These recognizing entities comprise approximately half
of the world's states and a significant percentage of the world's
population.7 3 Many of these states are also States Parties to the Rome
Statute, although admittedly Russia, China, India, and Indonesia are
not.74 While the United States does not currently recognize Palestine
69. CRAWFORD, supra note 40, at 61 (explaining that capacity to act
internationally conflates the requirements of government and independence).
70. See G.A. Res. 43/827, Annex II, UN Doc. A/43/827 (Nov. 18, 1988).
Certain authors argue that Palestine cannot be a state because it has not made
subsequent declarations of statehood, and it did not satisfy the criteria of statehood
at the time of its declaration in 1988. See e.g., Shaw Opinion, supra 66, para. 48, n.
61. This conclusion, however, is inconsistent with international law, which only
requires that statehood be established at some point.
71. International Recognition of the State of Palestine, PALESTINIAN NAT.
AUTH.,
http://web.archive.org/web/20051226213246/www.pna.gov.ps/Government/gov/re
cognition-of theState of Palestine.asp (last visited Sept. 1, 2011). But see 3.10 -
How Many Countries Recognize Palestine as a State?, INST. MIDDLE EAST
UNDERSTANDING, http://imeu.net/news/article0065.shtml (last visited Sept. 1,
2011) (noting that the Palestinian passport is only accepted by twenty-nine states).
72. See International Recognition of the State ofPalestine, supra, note 71.
73. For an argument that the international community has accepted the 1988
declaration as valid, see Quigley, supra note 34, at 4.
74. The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2011).
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as a state, it has expressed its intention to do so in the near future.7 5 It
is unclear, however, what actual changes in the situation on the
ground (aside from a negotiated peace with Israel) will prompt this
recognition. Palestine has been admitted as a member to the League
of Arab States,7 6 the Organization of the Islamic Conference," and
the Arab League Educational Cultural and Scientific Organization,
among others.78 Admittedly, these are all Arab organizations and
most fall under the umbrella of the League of Arab States. Palestine
has also signed several international conventions, including
investment and trade treaties with Egypt,79 the United States,o and
the European Union," and a variety of other minor agreements such
75. See Jeffrey Heller & Adam Entous, Obama Envoy Tells Israel U.S. Wants
Palestinian State, REUTERS (Apr. 16, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/id
UKTRE53F20V20090416 (reporting that Obama's envoy to the Middle East
stressed the President's commitment to "a two-state solution" in talks with Israeli
leaders); Clinton: Palestinian State 'Inescapable', USA TODAY, Mar. 3, 2009,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2009-03-03-clinton-israel N.htm
(highlighting statements by U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, emphasizing
the inevitability of a Palestinian state, while stressing the U.S.'s commitment to
Israel's security). It has not been argued in international law that statehood is the
gift of any particular state under either the declaratory or constitutive theories.
Thus, the U.S. position cannot be contemplating the creation of a state, but rather
the recognition of one.
76. See Pact of the League of Arab States Annex on Palestine, Mar. 22, 1945,
70 UNT.S. 237. Although the Pact specified that the League "shall be composed of
. . . independent Arab States," the Pact provided for a Palestinian delegate in light
of "Palestine's special circumstances," and specified that this arrangement would
last until Palestine achieved independence, at which point, it would presumably be
admitted as a state. Id. art. 1, Annex on Palestine.
77. See Member States, ORG. OF THE ISLAMIC CONF., http://www.oic-
oci.org/member states.asp (last visited Sept. 1, 2011).
78. See The Member States, ARAB LEAGUE EDUC. CULTURE & SCI. ORG.,
http://www.alecso.org.tn/Ing/index.php?option=com content&task=view&id= 12&
Itemid=13&lang-en (last visited Sept. 1, 2011).
79. See UN Comm'n on Trade and Dev. [UNCTAD], Bilateral Investment
Treaties: 1959-1999, at 50, UN Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2 (2000), available at
http:// www.unctad.org/en/docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf.
80. See Agreement on Encouragement of Investment, Aug. 11 & Sept. 12,
1994, U.S. - P.L.O., T.I.A.S. 12564 (entered into force Sept. 12, 1994). Note that
this agreement is with the PLO, not the "State of Palestine."
81. See Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on Trade and
Cooperation, Feb. 24, 1997, Eur. Comm. - P.L.O. (stating that the agreement was
executed by the PLO "for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip"); see also Kearney & Denayer, supra note 38, at para. 28
(arguing that the fact that the PLO can enter into agreements on behalf of the PNA
renders meaningless the limitations placed on the PNA by the Oslo Accords).
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as those on international roads,82 railways, 83 and maritime transport
cooperation.8 4 Regarding the latter agreements, each was accepted
for deposit by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a
privilege generally reserved for UN members. 85 Moreover,
Palestinian athletes have participated under the Palestine flag in the
Olympics since 1996 and with the International Federation of
Football Association since 1998. 86 Interestingly, as of 2003, the
American Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences in
Hollywood recognizes Palestine as a state for purposes of the Oscar
category for foreign films. Taken collectively, this practice appears
to weigh strongly in favor of statehood.
On the other hand, a number of organizations have refused or
otherwise postponed indefinitely Palestine's applications for
82. See, e.g., UN Secretary-General, Agreement on International Roads in the
Arab Mashreq, Palestine: Ratification (Depository Notification), UN Doc.
C.N.1275.2006.TREATIES-3 (Jan. 5, 2007); UN Secretary-General, Agreement on
International Roads in the Arab Mashreq, Palestinian Authority: Signature
(Depository Notification) UN Doc. C.N.572.2001.TREATIES-3 (June 7, 2001).
83. See, e.g., UN Secretary General, Agreement on International Railways in
the Arab Mashreq, Palestine: Ratification (Depository Notification) UN Doc.
C.N. I 274.2006.TREATIES-2 (Jan. 5, 2007); UN Secretary-General, Agreement on
International Railways in the Arab Mashreq, Palestine: Signature (Depository
Notification) UN Doc. C.N.285.2003.TREATIES-5 (Apr. 25, 2003).
84. See, e.g., UN Secretary General, Agreement on Maritime Transport
Cooperation in the Arab Mashreq, Palestine: Definitive Signature (Depository
Notification), UN Doc. XI.D.7, Ref. C.N.624.2005.TREATIES-10 (Aug. 9, 2005).
85. See UN Charter art. 102(1) ("Every treaty and every international
agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations after the present
Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat
and published by it.") (emphasis added).
86. See Palestinian Olympic Committee, INT'L OLYMPIC COMM.,
http://www.olympic.org/en/content/National-Olympic-Committees/palestine/ (last
visited Sept. 1, 2011); Historic Day for Palestine, INT'L FEDERATION OF Assoc.
FOOTBALL, (Oct. 24, 2008), http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/federation/president/
news/newsid=924099.html; INT'L FEDERATION OF ASSoc. FOOTBALL, FIFA
STATUTES: REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE STATUTES art. 10
(2008), available at http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/
administration/01/09/75/14/fifa statutes_072008_en.pdf (providing that "[a]ny
Association which is responsible for organising and supervising football in its
country may become a Member of FIFA" and clarifying that a country is defined
as "an independent state recognised by the international community") (emphasis
added).
87. See Oscars Will Recognize 'Palestine': Academy Includes Entry Among
'Record 55 Countries in Competition,' WORLDNETDAILY.COM (Oct. 22, 2003),
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLEID=3 5201.
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membership, among them the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization ("UNESCO"), the World Health
Organization ("WHO"), the Food and Agriculture Organization
("FAO"), the International Labor Organization ("ILO"), the
International Telecommunication Union ("ITU"), and the
Commonwealth. " In terms of treaties, Switzerland refused
Palestine's attempt to accede to the Geneva Conventions, as it was
entitled to do as the depositary state, but recognized as valid the
PLO's decision to abide by the conventions.89 For an entity to be a
88. See WHO, Study by the Director-General on the Admission of Palestine,
WHO Doc. A43/3 (1990); UN Educ. Scientific, & Cultural Org. [UNESCO],
Decisions Adopted by the Executive Board at Its 132nd Session 44-46 (Dec. 13,
1989), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0008/000845/084504e.pdf
(deferring consideration of the Palestinian application for membership "in a spirit
of constructive co-operation"); see also Frederic L. Kirgis Jr., Admission of
"Palestine" as a Member of a Specialized Agency and Withholding the Payment of
Assessments in Response, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 218 (1990) (noting that the United
States threatened to withhold its dues to the WHO, FAO, and other UN agencies in
order to prevent the admission of Palestine as a member); Commonwealth heads of
Government Meeting, Kampala, Uganda, Nov. 25-27, 2007, Membership of the
Commonwealth: Report of the Committee on Commonwealth Membership,
HGM(07)(FM)3 (Oct. 24, 2007), available at http://www.thecommonwealth.org/
shared asp files/GFSR.asp?NodelD=174532 (noting that certain Commissioners
in The Commonwealth believe that Palestine's membership should be deferred
until it attains statehood). It is notable that most of these organizations are UN
agencies or closely related to the United Nations and may have been guided by UN
practice on the matter.
Shortly before this article went to publication, UNESCO voted to admit
Palestine as a member. See Steven Erlanger & Scott Sayare, UNESCO Accepts
Palestinians as Full Members, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2011), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/01 /world/middleeast/unesco-approves-full-
membership-for-palestinians.html?_r- l&scp=2&sq=UNESCO&st=cse. The
decision to admit Palestine appears to have been based on functional criteria, i.e.
whether the entity purporting to be a state of Palestine can engage in and benefit
from the particular educational, scientific, and cultural projects done by UNESCO.
See, e.g., Address by Ms. Irina Bokova, Director-General of UNESCO on the
occasion of the agenda item concerning the admission of Palestine as UNESCO
State Member, Gen. Conf. 36th plen. sess., UNESCO Doc. DG/2011/147 (Oct. 31,
2011), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/002136/213660e.pdf.
89. INT'L COMM. RED CROSS, STATE PARTIES TO THE FOLLOWING
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND OTHER RELATED TREATIES AS OF 8-
SEP-2010 6 (2010), available at http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/(SPF)/partymain
treaties/SFile/IHL and other related Treaties.pdf (recognizing that the PLO is
"entrusted with the functions of the Government of the State of Palestine" and that
it decided via letter to "adhere to the Four Geneva Conventions," and explaining
that the Swiss Federal Council notified the Red Cross that it could not determine
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state, we might expect it to receive more confidence from the
international community.
Turning to United Nations practice specifically, the UN has
expressed an intention for Palestine to be independent and self-
governing since 1947.0 To date, Palestine has been admitted as an
observer to the United Nations and its documents are circulated
freely by the Secretariat. 91 Admission as an observer has long been
regarded as a preliminary gesture prior to attaining actual
statehood.92 Although formally an observer, Palestine's substantive
status is, in fact, something more. Palestine is accorded more
privileges than a mere observer, such as "the right to co-sponsor
resolutions." 93 Yet, both the UN General Assembly and Secretary-
General have declined to definitively say whether the entity is a
state.94
Based on the foregoing, Palestine undeniably has capacity to act
internationally, though this capacity is limited. If capacity is a
consequence of statehood, then Palestine must necessarily have some
aspects of statehood to exercise this capacity. If capacity to act
internationally is a criterion of statehood, then the question of
whether the PLO's letter "constituted an instrument of accession").
90. See generally G.A. Res. 181 (II), UN Doc. A/RES/181(II) (Nov. 29, 1947)
(describing the process for the withdrawal of the Palestinian Mandate and outlining
the creation of independent Jewish and Arab states).
91. See G.A. Res. 43/177, 1 3, UN Doc. A/RES/43/177 (Dec. 15, 1988)
(changing designation as observer from "P.L.O." to "Palestine"); G.A. Res.
43/160, 1, UN Doc. A/RES/43/160 (Dec. 9, 1988); G.A. Res. 3236/29, UN Doc.
A/Res/3236/29 (Nov. 22, 1979). The change in designation of Palestine from PLO
at the United Nations, however, was made "without prejudice to the observer status
and functions of the Palestine Liberation Organization within the United Nations
system ... See G.A. Res. 43/177, supra, 3.
92. See NGUYEN QUOC DINH ET AL., DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC [PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW] (2d ed. 1980). Of course, observer status does not mean that
an entity necessarily will attain statehood.
93. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 52/250, 11, Annex, UN Doc. A/RES/52/250 (July 13,
1998) (granting Palestine the "right to participate in general debate of the General
Assembly," the "right of reply," the "right to co-sponsor resolutions," the right to
raise points of order on issues affecting Palestine or the Middle East generally, and
the privilege of seating in order "immediately after non-member states, but before
the other observers").
94. See e.g., G.A. Res. 43/177, supra note 91, 1-3 (acknowledging the
Palestine National Council's 1988 declaration of statehood and noting "the need to
enable" Palestinian sovereignty over occupied territory while reaffirming
Palestine's observer status within the UN system).
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whether Palestine satisfies this criterion is one of degree. Palestine
satisfies the criterion only partly, and not to the same degree as other
states.
D. CONCLUSION ON PALESTINIAN STATEHOOD
This article argues that Palestine has attained some recognition as
a state, exhibits the essential features of a government, and manifests
some capacity to act internationally. Nevertheless, the effective
triumvirate of the PNA, PLO, and people of Palestine does not fully
and conclusively satisfy the objective Montevideo requirements for
statehood, and has not garnered subjective recognition from an
overwhelming number of the states in the world. Although Palestine
acts internationally in many ways and in many situations, it does not
enjoy the same degree of freedom in international relations as other
states. In other words, Palestine is not a state for all purposes, though
it appears to be incrementally exerting increasing independence. 95
Rather, Palestine has been regarded as a state at certain times by
certain actors in certain contexts. Palestine is most appropriately
categorized as a quasi-state.
E. QUASI-STATEHOOD
Entities can be recognized as states for certain purposes or in
certain contexts without being considered states for all purposes.
There have been many examples of such "relative" statehood. 96
These include the "A" Mandated Territories, 97 the Free City of
Danzig," the Holy See, 99 the Sovereign Military Order of Malta,100
95. See Tabory, supra note 322, at 142 (defining the PNA as a "non-State
entity"). See generally Benoliel & Perry, supra note 32 (presenting and refuting
arguments for recognizing Palestine as a state). But see generally JOHN QUIGLEY,
THE CASE FOR PALESTINE: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE (2005)
(evaluating the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and submitting that a
Palestinian state is possible); Memorandum from John Quigley to the Ofc. of the
Prosec., ICC (Mar. 23, 2009) reprinted in Summary of Submissions on Palestine,
supra note 16, Annex (responding to Crawford and contending that a Palestinian
state is consistent with international law).
96. Hans Kelsen, Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations,
35 AM. J. INT'L L. 605, 609 (1941) ("[T]he legal existence of a state . . . has a
relative character. A state exists legally only in its relations to other states. There is
no such thing as absolute existence.").
97. CRAWFORD, supra note 40, at 31.
98. Id. (noting that Danzig is treated as a state for purposes of article 71(2) of
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British India, 101 Ukraine and Belarus (formerly the Byelorussian
Soviet Socialist Republic), 0 2 protectorates and protected states such
as Bhutan and San Marino, 103 and associated states like Puerto
Rico.104
the rules of the Permanent Court of International Justice, but that its status as a
state in other contexts is unclear).
99. Id. at 37, n. 37.
100. Noel Cox, The Acquisition of Sovereignty by Quasi-states: The Case of the
Order of Malta, 6 MOUNTBATTEN J. LEG. STUDIEs 26, 47 (2002) (concluding that
the Order of Malta is not technically a state even though it has international legal
personality, and pointing out that the emergence of "newer types of international
entities" signifies the eroding relevance of traditional notions of state sovereignty).
101. See Crawford, supra note 46, at 320-23 (describing Great Britain's
relationship with the Indian Native States prior to 1947 and explaining that, while
Britain considered those areas "as extraterritorial . . . [and afforded them] the
general right to internal self-government," it also claimed the rights to "conduct
international relations, exercise . . . jurisdiction over Europeans and Americans, . . .
and [regulate their militaries]." Compare Maharaja of Tripura v. Prov. of Assam,
22 I.L.R. 64, 66 (High Ct. Calcutta, Ind. 1948) (holding that the Maharaja of
Tripura is an "independent sovereign" under international law), with Singh v.
Comm'r of Income Tax, Cent. & United, 10 I.L.R. 43, 46-47 (High Ct. Allahbad,
Ind. 1942) (holding that "Indian states," as suzerainties were "not independent" for
the purposes of British tax immunity), and R.S.B. Singh v. Vindhya Pradesh, 20
I.L.R. 3, 4 (India 1953) (holding that the entity was only "internally sovereign").
102. See UN Legal Counsel, Questions regarding the scale of assessment for
Belarus and Ukraine in the light of the change in the relationship between them
and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - Report of the Committee on
contributions on "Assessment of New member States" - General Assembly
Resolution 46/221 A and Rule 160 of the Rules of Procedure of the General
Assembly, 1992 UN Jurid. Y.B. 435, UN Sales No. 97.V.8 (confirming that
Ukraine and Belarus are "original Members" of the United Nations following their
dissolution from the Soviet Union).
103. See Crawford, supra note 46, at 288-89 (prescribing a general rule "that the
exercise of delegated powers pursuant to protectorate arrangements is not
inconsistent with statehood if the derogations from independence are based on
local consent, do not involve extensive powers of internal control and do not leave
the local entity without some degree of influence over the exercise of its foreign
affairs," and noting that Bhutan and San Marino both satisfy these basic criteria);
Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J.
(ser. B) No. 4, at 27 (Feb. 7) ("The extent of the powers of a protecting State in the
territory of a protected States depends, first, upon the Treaties between the
protecting State and the protected State establishing the Protectorate, and,
secondly, upon the conditions under which the Protectorate has been recognized by
third Powers as against whom there is an intention to rely on the provisions of
these Treaties.").
104. See generally CRAWFORD, supra note 40 (outlining the key characteristics
of associated states, which in some cases closely approximate statehood, and
noting the increased willingness of international organizations to admit associated
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In addition, many entities are now accepted as states despite a long
period of uncertainty regarding their status. 10 Canada and other
former Dominions of the British Empire are ready examples.
Canada's independence is best characterized as an evolving one. The
Constitutional Act of 1791,106 the British North America Acts of
1867 through 1975,107 the Statute of Westminster of 193 1,o10 and the
Constitution Act (Canada Act) of 1982 109 all represent the
incremental steps taken towards Canadian statehood. Moreover,
although the Parliament of the United Kingdom claimed the right to
legislate for Canada until 1982, 10 Canada was recognized as a
sovereign state and acted as such prior to that date.' Therefore,
states as full members or observers). For a detailed analysis of the debate
surrounding Puerto Rico's status as a commonwealth, see generally Lani E.
Medina, Note, An Unsatisfactory Case of Self-Determination: Resolving Puerto
Rico's Political Status, 33 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1048 (2010) (examining the
meaning of "self-determination" in international law, and arguing that "the people
of Puerto Rico have yet to fully exercise their right to self-determination").
105. Dissenters of Palestinian statehood often take an all or nothing approach,
ignoring the concrete steps Palestine has taken towards becoming a state. See, e.g.
Davenport Communication, supra note 32, at 8 (arguing that Palestine is "in the
midst of a process that may lead to statehood, but is not a state at this time").
106. Constitution Act, 1791, 31 Geo. 3, c. 31 (U.K.) (establishing the Canadian
government).
107. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. c. 3 (U.K.); British North America
Act, 1871, 34 & 35 Vict. c. 28 (U.K.); British North America Act, 1886, 49 & 50
Vict. c. 35 (U.K.); British North America Act, 1907, 7 Edw. VII, c. 11 (U.K.);
British North America Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. V, c. 45 (U.K.); Constitution Act,
1930, 20 & 21 Geo. V, c. 26 (U.K.); British North America Act, 1940, 3 & 4 Geo.
VI, c. 36 (U.K.); British North America Act, 1943, 6 & 7 Geo. VI, c. 30 (U.K.)
(repealed); British North America Act, 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. VI, c. 63 (U.K.)
(repealed); British North America Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 22 (U.K.);
British North America (No. 2) Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 81 (U.K.)
(repealed); British North America Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 304 (Can.); British North
America Act, 1965, 14 Eliz. 11, c. 4 (U.K.); British North America Act, 1974, 23
Eliz. II, c. 13 (U.K.); British North America Act (No. 1), 1975, 23 & 24 Eliz. II, c.
28 (U.K.); British North America Act (No. 2), 1975, 23 & 24 Eliz. II, c. 53 (U.K.).
108. See Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 4, arts. 2(2)-(4)
(U.K.) (providing Canada (and other "Dominions") the power to legislate
independently from England and extraterritorially).
109. See Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 pmbl. 2 (U.K.) (renouncing any residual
legislative authority of the United Kingdom's parliament to enact amendments to
the Canadian Constitution and, thus, patriating the Canadian Constitution).
110. See id.
111. See, e.g., Convention Between the Government of Canada and the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the
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throughout much of its history, Canada's status was that of a quasi-
state.
Even further, this situation is not dissimilar to that of the status of
international organizations. Some organizations have absolute legal
personality, such as the United Nations.112 Other organizations have
relative legal personality, meaning they have legal personality only
in relation to those members that accept the international
organization as such."1 Consequently, international law tolerates the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect
to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, 1980 Can. T.S. No. 25. The fact that the
United Kingdom entered into a treaty with Canada in 1980, at which point it
retained the right to legislate for Canada, suggests that even the United Kingdom
regarded its intra-Commonwealth relations as foreign relations. See also
Agreement on the Establishment of Direct Diplomatic Relations Between Canada
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1942 Can. T.S. No. 12; Agreement
Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics Providing for the Exchange of Consuls, 1942 Can. T.S. No. 9;
R. v. Sec'y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Indian Ass'n
of Alta. et al., [1982] Q.B. 892 (C.A.) (Eng.) (Denning, M.R., Kerr & May, J.J.)
(discussing the divisibility of the Crown as evolutionary through "constitutional
usage and practice"), aff'd (H. Lords, Mar. 11, 1982) (Diplock, Fraser of
Tullybelton, Russel of Killowen, Scarman & Bridge of Harwich, LL.), reprinted at
78 INT'L L. REPS. 421.
112. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 187-88 (Apr. 11) (concluding that the United
Nations has the capacity to sue a Member State on behalf of an injured agent). See
generally James E. Hickey, Jr., The Source of International Legal Personality in
the 21st Century, 2 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 1, 18 (1997) (documenting the rise
of international and regional organizations as legal personalities in the twentieth
century, and examining potential bases for the international legal personality of
new entities such as "nongovernmental organizations, multinational corporations
and to some extent, subnational governments" in the twenty-first century).
113. See CRAWFORD, supra note 40, at 30 (distinguishing between entities with
objective legal personality, which exists "wherever the rights and obligations of an
entity are conferred by general international law," and those cases where an entity
is created "by particular States for special purposes," and only those states are
bound). Compare David Ettinger, Comment, The Legal Status of the International
Olympic Committee, 4 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 97, 104 (1992) (mentioning that the
Olympic Charter has international personality by virtue of its near universal
activities, and that the norms embodies in the Olympic Charter rise to the level of
customary international law) with Romana Sadurska & C.M. Chinkin, The
Collapse of the International Tin Council: A Case of State Responsibility?, 30 VA.
J. INT'L L. 845, (1990) (describing the creation of the International Tin Council
("ITC") by over twenty tin producing and consuming states, and arguing that the
ITC and its Member States could be held liable by third party creditors in certain
circumstances).
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recognition of certain entities as states for certain purposes and not
for others.
Many factors suggest that Palestine has some form of relative
statehood status that could be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
the Rome Statute.1 14 First, in certain contexts, Palestine is regarded as
a state. I" In addition, even those states that have not recognized
Palestine as a state have accorded its envoys a form of diplomatic
relations and privileges and immunities. 116 Others have expressed
their hope or expectation that Palestine will be recognized as a state
in the future.'" Finally, scholars of international law have likened
Palestine to other entities that have some degree of capacity to act
internationally, including the Cook Islands, Greenland, Puerto Rico,
and Taiwan.I"1 Perhaps one day, the international community will
universally and conclusively recognize Palestine as a state, most
likely following a negotiated peace settlement. If that happens, the
present period is analogous to the transitory phase that marked
Canada's long process of achieving independence.
Accession to the Rome Statute will not be enough to constitute
Palestine as a state. A single act of accession to a treaty cannot
114. The PNA's attempt to accede to the ICC need not be considered a request
for recognition of an absolute Palestinian statehood. It makes no request of that
gravity in its application, though it does presuppose statehood. Thus, arguments
that PNA officials themselves doubt whether Palestine is a state are not relevant
here. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Case C-386/08, Brita GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen,
Judgment, 44-53 (Eur. Ct. Just., 4th Ch., Feb. 25, 2010) (recognizing that the
European Communities entered into trade agreements with Israel and the PLO
separately, and noting that each agreement "has its own territorial scope" with the
EC-PLO agreement applying to the West Bank and Gaza Strip). Moreover, even
Israel occasionally treats the PNA as a quasi-foreign entity for certain purposes.
See also, Israel: Prohibition Against Bribery ofForeign Public Officials, LIBRARY
OF CONG. (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc news?
disp3_1205401855 text (publicizing an amendment to an Israeli statute that
"prohibits bribery of public officials of foreign countries, and of international and
political entities, including the Palestinian Authority").
116. International Recognition of the State of Palestine, supra note 71 (listing
France, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United
Kingdom, Brazil, and Switzerland as among those non-recognizing countries that
have granted some form of diplomatic status to Palestinian representation).
117. See supra notes 70-87 and accompanying text. .
118. CRAWFORD, supra note 40, at 739-40 (including Palestine on the list of
"Territorial Entities Proximate to State").
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establish that an entity is a state for all purposes, just as one act of
recognition by one state would not render an entity a state.'19 In his
work on recognition, Hersch Lauterpacht opined that a supra-
national organ might one day be empowered to make conclusive
statehood determinations.12 0 John Dugard took this thesis one step
further and concluded that the United Nations had effectively
become that organ.121 This author is reluctant to go so far. It is far
from clear that the negotiating parties intended for the United
Nations to serve such a function. 122 Further, subsequent practice
rebuts the argument that membership in the United Nations is
synonymous with statehood. At its inception, the United Nations
excluded some entities from membership, even though it
acknowledged them as states. 123 Also, in practice, a UN member is
not obliged to recognize another member as a state, even though it
acknowledges the entity's membership in the United Nations. 124
119. See supra note 40-43 and accompanying text (accepting the constitutive
theory of statehood as the minority view).
120. See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 55
(1947).
121. See JOHN DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 3 (1987); see
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 201 comm. h.
("[A]dmission to membership in an international organization such as the United
Nations is an acknowledgement by the organization, and by those members who
vote for admission, that the entity has satisfied the requirements of statehood.");
THEODOR MERON, THE HUMANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 310 (2006)
("While distinct from the recognition of statehood, admission to international
organizations necessarily assumes recognition as a State."); Thomas D. Grant,
Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents, 37 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 403, 412 (reviewing various scholarly opinions on criteria for
statehood that look to the UN membership practices as evidence of statehood).
122. E.g., United Nation Conference on International Organizations, Norwegian
Delegation, Amendments and Observations on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, UN
Doc. 2, G/7(n)(1) T4 (May 4, 1945) (documenting a proposal by Norway that UN
members be permitted to advocate for the recognition of new States by other
member states); Hans Aufricht, Principles and Practices of Recognition by
International Organizations, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 679, 680 (1949) (asserting that
"simultaneous membership in an international organization is not a substitute for
dejure or defacto recognition by states").
123. See Leo Gross, Progress Towards Universality of Membership in the
United Nations, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 791, 826 n.168 (1956) (acknowledging that,
even by the Tenth Session of the UN General Assembly, "essential states like
Germany and Japan" were still not accepted as members).
124. Cf Aufricht, supra note 122, at 680-81 ("[A]dmission to [the League of
Nations] did not necessarily imply that each individual Member of the League was
therefore bound to recognize every other Member."). Recent examples include:
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Further, states are not obliged to join the UN merely because they are
states. 125 In any event, even if some supra-national organization was
competent to determine conclusively which entities are states, it
would most likely be the United Nations, not the ICC. Therefore,
Palestine's accession to the Rome Statute could be evidence of
statehood, but it would not impose a collective recognition obligation
on the other States Parties.
In conclusion, Palestine's statehood status is uncertain. It is, quite
frankly, a difficult case. Until its status becomes more defined,
Palestine is best classified as a quasi-state in acknowledgement of the
facts that it has been recognized by some states and that it has some
capacity to act internationally. If Palestine is a quasi-state, it may be
considered a state for specific purposes even though it has not
attained absolute statehood. For example, China and Russia, among
others, have recognized Palestine as a state, and presumably
Palestine must be treated as a state in its relations with those
countries. Indeed, extending the logic of this observation to its
conclusion suggests that China and Russia may be estopped from
denying Palestinian statehood. On the other hand, the United Nations
has so far reached the opposite conclusion, so Palestine need not be
treated as a state in UN matters for the time being. Quasi-state status,
however, means that Palestine's relations with the ICC are an open
question. The ICC should not conclude that international law
demands that it refuse to recognize Palestine as a state. Rather,
international law may permit the ICC to recognize it as a state for the
limited purposes of jurisdiction or accession.
F. THE ROME STATUTE AND NON-STATE ENTITIES
As a quasi-state, this article contends that Palestine may accede to
the Rome Statute or otherwise accept the jurisdiction of the Court.
As observed above, the Rome Statute appears to limit membership to
Israel's lack of recognition by many Middle Eastern states, Liechtenstein's lack of
recognition by Czechoslovakia, and Belize's lack of recognition by Guatemala.
125. See James Crawford, State Practice and International Law in Relation to
Unilateral Secession, in ANNE F. BAYEFSKY, SELF-DETERMINATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: QUEBEC AND LESSONS LEARNED 31, 35 n. 7 (2000) (noting
that Switzerland, the Vatican City, Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, and Tuvalu, are among
those states which had not sought membership in the United Nations at the time).
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states by its express terms.126 Some authorities have stated that the
ICC must determine whether Palestine is a state before it may be
permitted to join the Court. 127 This article suggests a different
possibility; namely, that the Rome Statute's definition of "state" can
be interpreted to include quasi-states such as Palestine.
International organizations may limit membership to states but
international law does not require them to do so.1 28 Indeed, some
organizations expressly provide that members need not be states,
including, inter alia, the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of
States ("ACP");12 9 Asian Development Bank ("ADB"), 13 0 Caribbean
Community and Common Market ("CARICOM"),31 Economic and
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific ("ESCAP"),13 2 European
and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organization, 13 International
Civil Aviation Organization ("ICAO"), 134 International Fund for
126. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 4(1), 9(1)-(2), 11(2), 12(1), 12(3),
13(a), 14, 17(1)(a)-(b), 18, 125(1), 125(3), 127(1).
127. See Rotella, supra note 17 (quoting the Israeli Foreign Minister's belief that
"[tihe ICC charter is adhered to by sovereign states, and the Palestinian Authority
has not yet been recognized as one, so it cannot be a member . . . [the Palestinian
declaration] doesn't mean anything except that it's a good propaganda stunt");
Puppinck Memorandum, supra note 48, at 11 (stating categorically that "non-state
entities" are not permitted to accede to the Rome Statute).
128. See FELICE MORGENSTERN, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 50-51 (1986).
129. See Partnership Agreement Between the Members of the African,
Caribbean and Pacific Group of States and Its Member States, of the One Part, and
the European Community and Its Member States, of the Other Part art. 4, June 23,
2000, 2000 O.J. (L 317) 3 [hereinafter The Cotonou Agreement] (explaining the
role of non-State actors); A CP Member States, AFRICAN, CARIBBEAN, AND PACIFIC
GRP. OF STATES, http://www.acpsec.org/en/acpstates.htm) (last visited Sept. 1,
2011) (listing Cook Islands and Niue as members).
130. See Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank art. 3(3), Dec. 4,
1965, 17 U.S.T. 1418; CRAWFORD, supra note 40, at 633 n.146 (reporting
admission of Cook Islands as a member).
131. See Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean
Community Including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy arts. 3(2), 231,
July 5, 2001, available at http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/revised-treaty-
text.pdf (admitting territories in the Caribbean region).
132. See Members, ESCAP, http://www.unescap.org/about/member.asp (last
visited Sept. 1, 2011) (listing Cook Islands, Niue, and Northern Mariana Islands as
associate members).
133. See Convention for the Establishment of the European and Mediterranean
Plant Protection Organization arts. III, XXI, Apr. 18, 1951, U.K.T.S. 44 (1956).
134. See Contracting States, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
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Agricultural Development,' International Federation of Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies ("IFRCS"), 136 International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions ("ICFTU"), 137 International
Olympic Committee ("IOC"), 1" Pacific Community ("PC"), '3
Pacific Island Forum ("PIF"),14 0 South Pacific Regional Trade and
Economic Cooperation Agreement, 141 Universal Postal Union, 142
(ICAO), http://www.icao.int/cgi/statesDB4.pl?en (last visited Sept. 1, 2011)
(listing Cook Islands as a contracting state).
135. See Agreement Establishing the International Fund for Agricultural
Development art. 3(1)(b), June 13, 1976, 28 U.S.T. 8435 (allowing groups of
States to join); IFAD Member States, INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR AGRICULTURAL
DEVELOPMENT FUND, http://www.ifad.org/govemance/ifad/ms.htm (last visited
Sept. 1, 2011) (listing Cook Islands as a Member State)..
136. See Constitution of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies arts. 1, 6-7, available at http://www.ifrc.org/Docs/pubs/who/
constitution/Constitution revised-en.pdf (membership is comprised of National
Societies); Directory, INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS AND RED
CRESCENT SOCIETIES, http://www.ifrc.org/ADDRESS/directory.asp (last visited
Sept. 1, 2011) (listing Cook Islands).
137. See Constitution of the International Federation of Free Trade Unions art.
I(a)-(b), available at http://www.icftu.org/www/pdflConstitution- 1 8.pdf (admitting
trade union organizations); ICFTU Address Book, INT'L FEDERATION OF FREE
TRADE UNIONS, http://www.icftu.org/addresslist.asp?Language=EN (last visited
Sept. 1, 2011) (listing the trade unions of Cook Islands and Puerto Rico as
members).
138. See INT'L OLYMPIC COMM., OLYMPIC CHARTER R. 28(3), 31(1) (July 7,
2007), available at http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en report122.pdf (creating
National Olympic Committees, which exclusively represent their respective
countries, and defining "country" as "an independent state recognized by the
international community"); see also CRAWFORD, supra note 40, at 633 nn.146-47
(reporting admission of Cook Islands and Puerto Rico as members).
139. See Consolidation of Agreed Provisions and Practices Relating to the
Establishment and Operations of the South Pacific Commission, Including the
Canberra Agreement of 1947 as Amended arts. II(2)(a), available at
http://wwwx.spc.int/coastfish/canberra.htm (admitting territories in the Pacific
Ocean administered by a participating Government, amongst other requirements);
SPC Member Countries, SOUTH PACIFIC COMMISSION, http://www.spc.int/pps/spc
membercountries.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2011) (listing Cook Islands, Niue, and
Northern Mariana Islands as members).
140. See Agreement Establishing the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat art. IV,
Oct. 30, 2000, available at http://www.forumsec.org/resources/uploads/
attachments/documents/Agreement%20Establishing%20the%20PIFS,%202000.pd
f (listing governments of Australia, the Cook Islands, Federated States of
Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea,
the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvala, and
Vanuatu as entitled to membership).
141. See South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement
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World Federation of Trade Unions, 14 3 and the World Meteorological
Organization.'" Most of these are small organizations of relatively
minor, topical, or historical importance. However, other more
widely-known organizations also include non-state entities among
their members-including the FAO, 145 ILO,146 Interpol,14 7 League of
art. I, July 14, 1980, available at http://www.forumsec.org.fj/pages.cfn/about-
us/member-countries/ (listing Cook Islands and Niue as "Forum Island countries"
and Cook Islands additionally as a "Smaller Forum Island" country).
142. See Constitution of the Universal Postal Union arts. 2, 11, July 10, 1964, 16
U.S.T. 129; Member Countries, UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION, http://www.upu.int/
en/the-upu/member-countries.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2011) (listing Netherlands
Antilles and Aruba as single member, and also the U.K. overseas territories) .The
UPU permits the admission of a member that represents a group of states or non-
autonomous territories: the Netherlands Antilles and Suriname joined as a single
member under this provision.
143. See Constitution of the World Federation of Trade Unions art. 1(1),
available at http://www.wftucentral.org/?page_id=246&language=en (admitting
trade union organizations as members); CRAWFORD, supra note 40, at 633 n.147
(reporting admission of Puerto Rico as a member).
144. See Convention of the World Meteorological Organization art. 3(d), Oct.
11, 1947, 77 UNT.S. 143 (allowing any territory, group of territories, trust
territory, or group of trust territories maintaining its own meteorological service to
join under specified conditions); see also id. at Annex II (including Palestine).
145. See Constitution of the UN Food and Agric. Org. art. 11, available at
http://www.fao.org/docrep/009/j8038e/j8038e00.htm (amending the constitution to
permit any regional economic integration organization to join); Rachel Frid, The
European Economic Community: A Member of a Specialized Agency of the United
Nations, 4 EuR. J. INT'L L. 239, 253-54 (1993) (discussing the unique "mixed
membership" status of regional economic integration organizations, such as the
European Economic Community, in the FAO and other international
organizations); see also FAO Members, UN FOOD & AGRIC. ORG.,
http://termportal.fao.org/faonocs/nocs/pages/homeNocs.jsp (last visited Sept. 1,
2011) (listing the Cook Islands and Niue as members).
146. See Constitution of the International Labour Organization art. 1(2), 1(3),
available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/constq.htm (providing that states
seeking admission to the ILO must be original members of the United Nations, or
any state admitted to the United Nations). But see Alphabetical List of ILO
Member Countries, INT'L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/public/english/
standards/relm/country.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2011) (listing Namibia as a
member country); EBERE OSIEKE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION 24-28 (1985) (noting that Namibia was
first admitted to the ILO prior to attaining statehood, and explaining that, even
though Namibia was not yet a state and its admission did not require other states to
recognize it as such, upon its admission to the ILO, Namibia was on "equal
footing" with other ILO members for the purposes of the ILO).
147. See INTERPOL Constitution arts. 4, 45, available at
http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/LegalMaterials/constitution/constitutionGenR
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Nations, 148 WHO, 149 World Trade Organization ("WTO"), 15o and
UNESCO,' as well as possibly the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund. 152 However, some of these organizations do not
eg/constitution.asp?HM=1 (stating that countries delegate police bodies as
members of the organization); INTERPOL Member Countries, INTERPOL,
http://www.interpol.int/public/Region/Americas/Members.asp (last visited Sept. 1,
2011) (listing Puerto Rico as a sub-bureau of the United States).
148. See League of Nations Covenant art. I, para. 2 ("Any fully self-governing
State, Dominion or Colony not named in the Annex may become a Member of the
League. . . ."); see also MALBONE W. GRAHAM, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND
THE RECOGNITION OF STATES 26-32 (1933) (explaining the debate over admitting
states that had not been recognized de jure and emphasizing that a state not so
recognized could still be admitted to the League of Nations). But see DAVID
HUNTER MILLER, ITHE DRAFTING OF THE COVENANT 164, 284 (1969) (noting that
the League of Nations did not admit India and the Philippines because they were
not fully self-governing); Michael M. Gunter, Comment, Liechtenstein and the
League of Nations: A Precedent for the United Nation's Ministate Problem?, 68
AM. J. INT'L L. 496, 497-99 (1974) (describing how the League of Nations rejected
Liechtenstein while acknowledging it was a state).
149. See Constitution of the World Health Organization art. 8, available at
http://www.who.int/countries/en/ (allowing territories or groups of territories not
conducting their own international relations to be admitted as Associate Members
upon meeting specified conditions); Countries, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/countries/en/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2011) (listing Cook Islands
and Niue as members).
150. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization arts.
XI(l), XXII(1), XIV(1), Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 UNT.S. 154[hereinafter Marrakesh
Agreement] (permitting the European Communities to accept the agreement as a
separate member).
151. See Constitution of the UN Educ., Scientific & Cultural Org. art. II(1)-(3),
available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URLID=15244&URLDO=DO_
TOPIC&URL SECTION=201.html (allowing those who are members of the
United Nations to be members of UNESCO as well as territories or groups of
territories not responsible for the conduct of their international relations); Member
States, UNESCO, http://erc.unesco.org/portal/UNESCOMemberStates.asp?
language=en (last visited Sept. 1, 2011) (listing Cook Islands and Niue as
members).
152. See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Articles of
Agreement art. II(l)(b), Feb. 16, 1989, available at http://siteresources.world
bank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/ibrd-articlesofagreement.pdf ("Membership
shall be open to other members of the [International Monetary] Fund, at such times
and in accordance with such terms as may be prescribed by the Bank."); Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund art. 11(2), Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat.
1401, 2 UNT.S. 40 (amended in 1969) ("Membership shall be open to other
countries at such times and in accordance with such terms as may be prescribed by
the Board of Governors. These terms, including the terms for subscriptions, shall
be based on principles consistent with those applied to other countries that are
already members."); see also Erik Denters, Representation of the EC in the IMF, in
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afford full voting rights to non-independent states because of their
special status, 53 and the constitutive instruments of many of these
organizations appear to limit membership to states. For example,
many organizations mention "states" only in their founding
instruments, but have nonetheless accepted non-states as members.
The admission of non-state entities may be accomplished by
amending the founding instrument, but in many cases, non-states are
simply accepted based on a functional understanding of the term
"state" in the constitutive instrument.15 4
In fact, the United Nations itself has applied a liberal, functional
approach to the statehood requirement. The UN Charter
contemplates that only states can be members,'15 that only states may
bring matters involving peace and security to the attention of the
United Nations, 5 6 and that states are the only non-member entities
which may "participate, without a vote" in discussions before the
Security Council.I"
These statehood requirements stand in stark contrast to the original
inclusion of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republics ("the S.S.R.s"), as they were not independent states.' The
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY LAW: ISSUES FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 211, 219-21
(Mario Giovanoli ed., 2000) (arguing that although the IMF Articles use the word
"country" and do not provide specifically for non-state members, its provision for
"countries" could be read to permit an entity such as the EC/EU); Press Release,




:258599,00.html (noting that Kosovo, whose statehood is controversial, was
admitted as a member of the World Bank).
153. See, e.g., Convention of the World Meteorological Organization, supra
note 144, art. 11(a) (restricting voting on specific subjects to only "Members which
are States").
154. See, e.g., supra note 42-43.
155. See UN Charter arts. 3, 4.
156. See id. arts. 11(2), 35(2).
157. See id. art. 32; Provisional Rules of Procedure of the UN Security Council,
r. 14, 2410th mtg., UN Doc. S/96/Rev. 7 (Dec. 21, 1983) (requiring members and
non-member states participating in Security Council meetings to submit credentials
prior to the meeting).
158. See UN Legal Counsel, supra note 102, at 435 (concluding that Belarus and
Ukraine, despite constitutional changes since their entry into the United Nations,
retain their status as original Members).
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case of the S.S.R.s is not easily distinguished on the basis of the fact
that they were "original" rather than "subsequent" members. First,
there is no clear legal basis for an exception for original members in
the UN Charter because the Charter assumes that original members
are also "states." Even accepting the argument that an exception for
original membership exists as valid, it still does not explain why the
S.S.R.s would be considered qualified to join as original members
when they were unquestionably constituent republics of the U.S.S.R.,
which was also itself a member of the United Nations. This is
comparable to permitting California and New York to join the United
Nations as members in their own right, even though the United States
is already a member.
An alternative explanation for the S.S.R.s' membership is that the
drafters of the UN Charter contemplated that Ukraine and Belarus
would be members from the outset. This explanation suggests a
liberal intent behind the original meaning of the term "state." This
interpretation is supported by the later admission of India and the
Philippines, as well as the admission of other entities that were not
widely considered states at the time of accession. 159
As it pertains to the rule that only states may bring matters to the
attention of the Security Council or participate in Security Council
discussions, this interpretation of "state" has also been liberally
applied. Both Indonesia and Hyderabad, as well as Tunisia and
Kuwait, have either brought matters to the attention of the Security
159. See DUGARD, supra note 121, at 52-55 (discussing Byelorussia, India,
Lebanon, Namibia, the Philippines, Syria, and the Ukraine); see also Roger
O'Keefe, The Admission to the United Nations of the Ex-Soviet and Ex-Yugoslav
States, 1 BALTIC Y.B. INT'L L. 167, 171-76 (2001) (observing that the admission of
Moldova, Georgia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina to the United Nations when each had
only tenuous governmental authority demonstrates the United Nations' "flexible
approach to the formal criteria for membership"); cf MORGENSTERN, supra note
128, at 50 (noting the ILO's admission of Vietnam in 1950, at a time when France
still exerted influence over Vietnam's foreign affairs). But see UN SCOR, 16th
Sess., 985th mtg. at 8-10, UN Doc S/PV.985 (Nov. 30, 1961) (presenting
arguments made regarding whether Kuwait was sufficiently independent from the
United Kingdom to be admitted to the United Nations); ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 16-17 (1969) (suggesting that although certain countries that fell
short of meeting the criteria for statehood, like India, were admitted as original
members to the United Nations, these cases are "not truly indicative of United
Nations practice").
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Council or been invited to participate in discussions, 160 despite
widespread dispute over the status of their statehood at the time of
the invitation. 161 Not all of these entities received widespread
recognition as states following their participation in Security Council
discussions, particularly Hyderabad.
Admittedly, this interpretation of "state" might be an aberration;
otherwise, the procedural consequences of statehood could supersede
an effort to answer the substantive question of whether statehood
exists. For instance, in debates before the Security Council regarding
whether an entity could be a "state" for council purposes even if it
lacks total sovereignty, some UN members have contended that both
sides to a dispute ought to be heard because the whole purpose of the
Security Council is to resolve disputes. 162 Crawford argues that,
while this is not a definitive argument, "[tihis is a reasonable position
provided the entity [presenting its side of the dispute] has some status
as a putative State." Crawford adopts a cautious stance as to the
meaning of "state" in Article 32 of the UN Charter in light of the
"variable practice" of the Security Council. 163 While some
delegations were refused on the basis that they did not represent
"states,"l 64 practice illustrates that the United Nations considers the
term "state" liberally in certain circumstances, provided the entity
has some degree of statehood. 165 Palestine confirms this
160. See UN SCOR, 2d Sess., 180th mtg. at 1940, UN Doc. S/447 (Aug. 12,
1947) (voting to invite representatives of Indonesia to discuss its admission to the
United Nations with the Security Council, and emphasizing that this invitation
"would not bind any State to recognize the independence or sovereignty of the
Indonesian Republic"); UN SCOR, 3d. Sess., 357th mtg. at 11, UN Doc. S/988,
S/998, S/1000 (Sept. 16, 1948) (inviting the representative from Hyderabad to
make a statement regarding prior communications sent to the UN Security
Council).
161. See, e.g., UN SCOR, 2d. Sess., 184th mtg., at 1984-5 (Aug. 14, 1947)
(noting the U.K. delegate's "grave doubts" over the Security Council's invitation
to Indonesia, and his belief that "[the Security Council had] taken a wrong step" in
the matter). In addition, although Tunisia - and possibly Kuwait - arguably had
international legal personality prior to invasion that was simply dormant until
independence, neither were de facto independent operating entities at the time
when they addressed the Security Council.
162. CRAWFORD, supra note 40, at 190-91.
163. Id. at 191.
164. See, e.g., UN SCOR, 2d Sess., 193d mtg., at 2172 (Aug. 22, 1947) (voting
not to admit representatives of East Indonesia and Borneo to the Security Council).
165. See HIGGINS, supra note 159, at 42-43 ("If the term 'state' has no absolute
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interpretation of statehood. The Security Council has already
permitted Palestine to participate in sessions, implicitly
acknowledging that it has a sufficient degree of statehood for this
purpose. 166 The relationship between the ICC and Palestine is
analogous. If the question of accession or acceptance of the Court's
jurisdiction hinges on statehood, which in turn hinges on the question
of capacity, then it would be circular for capacity to hinge, in turn, on
statehood.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("Vienna
Convention") also supports this reading of the Rome Statute. Under
the Vienna Convention, a term's "ordinary meaning" controls, which
is deduced by looking at the term's meaning in context and in
consideration of the treaty's overall "object and purpose." 167
However, when interpreting their constitutive instruments, recourse
is usually had to teleological interpretation.16 8 The language of the
Rome Statute clearly limits membership to "states;" however, this
article points to past and current international practice as evidence of
a flexible approach to the "ordinary meaning" of "state." For this
reason, the object and purpose of the Rome Statute becomes even
more important. Simply stated, the object and purpose of the Rome
Statute is to end impunity for international crimes that are "of
concern to the international community as a whole."l6 9 The ICC does
not merely aim to end impunity for international crimes that are of
concern to states. In light of that purpose, permitting territorial
entities that have some, but not all, of the attributes of states to
accede to the Rome Statute would further the purpose. In fact,
fixed meaning, but rather varies slightly in meaning according to the claim for
which it is being used, then it is likely that entities which would not be considered
states for the purposes of a claim for comprehensive participation in the United
Nations might nevertheless satisfy the requirements of statehood where the claim
is for limited participation.").
166. Accord Quigley, supra, note 34, at 5.
167. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155
UNT.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
168. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-1, para. 1 1, 18 Decision on
Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal of Jurisdiction (Int'l Crim. Trib. For the
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (observing that international tribunals retain
inherent authority to determine their own jurisdiction); Reparation for Injuries
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. Reps.
174, 178-9 (Apr. 11).
169. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl.
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prohibiting such an entity would frustrate the ICC's purpose: the
perpetrators of many alleged international crimes could escape
responsibility based on the simple fact that they are stateless
(Palestinian "nationals") or because the statehood status of the area
of the world in which they committed their acts is less than
absolutely clear. As a basis for comparison it is interesting to recall
that Interpol permits the participation of non-state members based on
the pragmatic pursuit of the organization's objective to combat
transnational crime.17 0 Although not all international crimes have a
transnational component, the analogy is apt insofar as the ICC's
ability to successfully combat impunity for serious crimes worldwide
depends on its ability to extend its jurisdiction widely. Given the
vague nature of the term state and the need for an object and purpose
interpretive approach, the term "state" may be interpreted broadly
and functionally within the rules of the Vienna Convention.
This interpretation is also necessitated by the law binding all of the
organs of the Court. The applicable law of the ICC consists of the
Rome Statute, Court regulations, and other sources of international
law.171 Further, the ICC must apply and interpret the law, regardless
of its source, in a fashion that is "consistent with internationally
recognized human rights." 72 In the case of Palestine, it is worth
mentioning that this last requirement arguably applies to all of the
organs of the Court, including the Registry. The language of the
Rome Statute refers to the law applicable to "the Court,"' 73 which is
in turn defined as a "permanent institution" comprised of four
separate organs, of which the judiciary is just one.17 4 The Registrar is
170. See INTERPOL Constitution, supra note 147, arts. 1, 4.
171. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 21(1)(a)-(b) (recognizing "applicable
treaties," "the principles and rules of international law," and "the international law
of armed conflict" as binding on the ICC). Secondarily, the ICC may extract and
apply "general principles of law" based on national laws from around the world.
Id. art. 21(1)(c).
172. Id. art. 21(3).
173. Id.. art. 21(1).
174. See id. arts. 1, 34 (listing the four organs of the ICC as: the Presidency, the
Judicial Division, the Office of the Prosecutor, and the Registry); see also Steven
Freeland, How Open Should the Door Be? - Declarations by Non-States Parties
Under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 75
NORDIc J. INT'L L. 211, 218-19 (2006) (describing the procedural rules that apply
to declarations lodged with the ICC registrar and stating that the ICC rules are
unclear as to the exact course of action the Registrar must take regarding such
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a creation of the Rome Statute and is empowered under the Rome
Statute to accept registrations of accession and declarations of
acceptance of jurisdiction. 115 It therefore makes sense that the
Registrar would also be bound by the Rome Statute. If that is the
case and the Registrar is bound by the requirement that the Rome
Statute be interpreted and applied consistently with human rights
obligations, this perhaps also obliges the Registrar to apply a liberal
reading of the term "state" when evaluating Palestine's declaration
if doing so will achieve its humanitarian goals of ending impunity."'
It appears that the ICC has already taken the liberal approach. The
list of States Parties to the Rome Statute includes entities widely
acknowledged to be states.' 77 Still, many prominent states, such as
the United States, China, Russia, India, and Indonesia, and a number
of countries from the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia, are
not members of the ICC."78 This author is aware of only one possible
case in which a State Party to the ICC has not recognized another
State Party as a "state"; until 2009, Lichtenstein did not recognize the
Czech and Slovak Republics. 17 9 Currently, however, one State Party
to the ICC is not widely regarded as an independent state-the Cook
Islands.8 0
The Cook Islands is a self-governing entity in free association
with New Zealand."' Residents of the islands are considered New
declarations).
175. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 12(3), 43.
176. It appears that the Registrar has taken this position because the Registrar's
office acknowledged receipt of Mr. Khashan's letter, but stated that the ICC judges
must make the final determination of Article 12(3) in this situation. See REPORT OF
THE INDEPENDENT FACT FINDING COMMITTEE ON GAZA: No SAFE PLACE, supra
note 8, paras. 589-90.
177. The State Parties to the Rome Statute, INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2011).
178. See id.
179. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (discussing the dispute between
Liechtenstein and the Czech and Slovak Republics); see also Rob Cameron,
Liechtenstein, Czech Republic Establish Relations After Long Property Dispute,
CESKY ROZHLAS [CZECH RADIO] (Sept. 9, 2009, 4:29 PM),
http://www.radio.cz/en/section/curraffrs/liechtenstein-czech-republic-establish-
relations-after-long-property-dispute.
180. See Cook Islands: Ratification and Implementation Status, INT'L CRIM. CT.,
http://www.ice-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/Asian+States/Cook+Islands.htm
(last visited Sept. 1, 2011).
181. See Cook Islands Constitution Amendment Act 1965 (amending Cook
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Zealand nationals.18 2 Although it has never done so, the Cook Islands
can unilaterally declare full independence.183 The Cook Islands is not
a member of the United Nations,18 4 though it is a member of the
FAO, PIF, ADB, ICAO, WHO, and UNESCO,' as well as an
associate member of the Commonwealth, and the United Nations
Economic and Social Commission for Asia."' The Cook Islands has
signed international treaties such as the Convention on the Rights of
the Child,' and established diplomatic relationships with nineteen
countries.1' As noted above, Crawford designates both the Cook
Islands and Palestine as "Territorial Entities Proximate to State." 89
Thus, like Palestine, the Cook Islands is most appropriately termed a
quasi-state. The Cook Islands acceded to the Rome Statute on July
Islands Constitution Act 1964).
182. See Voyage to Statehood, COOK ISLANDS Gov'T,
http://www.cookislands.gov.ck/history/php (last visited Sept. 1, 2011).
183. See World Factbook: Cook Islands, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cw.html (last
updated Dec. 8, 2010).
184. See Member States, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/members/ (last
visited Sept. 1, 2011).
185. See FAO Governing Bodies: FAO Membership as at 17 November 2007,
UN FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., http://www.fao.org/unfao/govbodies/membemations3
en.asp (last visited Sept. 1, 2011); Member Countries, PAC. ISLANDS FORUM
SECRETARIAT, http://www.forumsec.org.fj/pages.cfi/about-us/member-countries/
(last visited Sept. 1, 2011); Regions and Countries, ASIAN DEV. BANK,
http://www.adb.org/countries (last visited Dec. 27, 2010); Contracting States,
INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., http://www.icao.int/cgi/statesdb4.pl?en (last visited
Dec. 27, 2010); Countries, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/
countries/en/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2011); Member States, UNESCO,
http://erc.unesco.org/portal/UNESCOMemberStates.asp?language=en (last visited
Sept. 1, 2011).
186. See Country Profiles: New Zealand - Cook Islands, COMMONWEALTH
SECRETARIAT,
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Yearbooklnternal/140411/140412/cook islands
/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2011); Members, UJNESCAP, http://www.unescap.org/about/
member.asp (last visited Sept. 1, 2011).
187. See, e.g., Status of Treaties, Convention of the Rights of the Child, UN
TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY
&mtdsg no=IV-1 1 &chapter-4&ang=en (last visited Sept. 1, 2011).
188. See Voyage to Statehood, supra note 182 (noting that "the Cook Islands has
diplomats in New Zealand and the European Communities," as well as honorary
consuls in Germany, France, and United Kingdom).
189. See supra note 137 and accompanying text; see also CRAWFORD, supra
note 40, at 739.
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18, 2008.190 The ICC's decision to accept the accession of the Cook
Islands generated no controversy. In practice, therefore, the ICC
already exercises a degree of flexibility in how it interprets the term
"state" for the purposes of the Rome Statute, and states and other
interested parties seem to have accepted such interpretation in those
instances.
The same argument holds for acceptance of the Court's
jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis. Article 12(3) of the Rome
Statute employs the term "state" like the articles discussing
membership. 191 As the above discussion demonstrates, international
law does not require an international organization to interpret the
word "state" in its constitutive document in a restrictive fashion for
membership purposes. It therefore follows that international law also
permits a liberal interpretation of the same term in other sections of
the instrument. As discussed previously, in the case of Hyderabad,
the entity was permitted to bring a matter to the attention of the
Security Council even though it was not a member of the United
Nations or widely regarded as a state (or even later regarded as
such).192 The Security Council read the UN Charter to allow the
broadest interpretation of the term "state" based on its purpose of
providing a forum for each party in a dispute to have its views
heard.19
In the Gaza situation, there is an imbalance in the ability of the
two parties to submit the situation to ICC jurisdiction because of
Palestine's uncertain status. The Vienna Convention instructs that
treaty terms should be interpreted with consideration for the object
and purpose of the treaty, and the object and purpose of the Rome
Statute is to end impunity for war crimes. In addition, international
law does not require a narrow interpretation of the word "state" for
purposes of an Article 12(3) acceptance of jurisdiction. Thus, in
order to fulfill the Rome Statute's purpose of promoting justice for
victims and perpetrators of war crimes, the ICC should recognize
that Palestine is at least a quasi-state, and interpret the Rome Statute
190. Cook Islands: Ratification and Implementation Status, supra note 180.
191. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 125(1), (3) (declaring that the Rome
Statute is open for signature or accession by "all States").
192. See UN SCOR, 3d Sess., 357th mtg., supra note 157, at 11. It is unclear
whether Hyderabad was ever truly recognized as an independent state.
193. See CRAWFORD, supra note 40, at 190-91.
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liberally to allow for its accession or acceptance of the Court's
jurisdiction.
III. CAPACITY OF THE PNA TO ACT
INTERNATIONALLY
Palestine is arguably a state for the purposes of the Rome Statute,
but in order to ascertain whether the ICC can exercise its jurisdiction
over Gaza, it is necessary to examine whether the PNA, specifically,
has the capacity to accept the Court's jurisdiction on behalf the
"state." As discussed earlier, the people of Palestine, the PLO, and
the PNA all currently represent the Palestinian entity. 19 4 Admittedly,
it is unclear in which of these capacities the PNA Justice Minister
accepted the Court's jurisdiction-Minister Khashan made his
declaration in the name of the "Government of Palestine," 1 and
based on the ICC's response, the Registrar apparently interpreted this
to mean the PNA. 19 6 Some have observed that Palestine cannot join
the ICC if it does not have the capacity to do so, 197 and that the
refusal of Hamas in Gaza to recognize the PNA restricts the PNA's
capacity over Gaza.198 This section first explores whether the PNA
has the capacity to accede to the Rome Statute or otherwise accept
the Court's jurisdiction under the Oslo Accords, and concludes that it
may, based on its power to establish a judiciary. Even if the PNA
does not have this capacity under the Oslo Accords, as a quasi-state,
Palestine might have the inherent capacity to do so notwithstanding
the Oslo Accords.
194. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
195. See Palestinian Declaration, supra note 1.
196. See Letter from Silvana Arbia, supra note 1.
197. See Rotella, supra note 17 (reporting that the ICC prosecutor must
determine whether the Palestinian Authority can legally recognize the ICC's
authority). See generally Benoliel & Perry, supra note 32, at 79-127 (considering
the many reservations to allowing Palestine to join the ICC, and arguing that it
must be recognized as a State in order for the ICC to have jurisdiction).
198. See Rotella, supra note 17 (noting Israeli officials' concern that the
residents of Gaza do not recognize the jurisdiction of the PNA); Davenport
Communication, supra note 32, at 9-10 (asserting that Hamas controls civil
administrative agencies to the exclusion of the PA, and that Hamas in fact
persecutes supporters of the PNA and the PLO in Gaza).
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A. CAPACITY TO ACT UNDER THE OSLO ACCORDS
A preliminary consideration is whether the Oslo Accords have, in
fact, lapsed. If they have, then the terms governing jurisdictional
competence are no longer in effect. The Accords were specifically
provided to put a system of governance in place for a term of five
years, beginning upon the withdrawal of IDF forces in June 1994.199
Some argue that Israel's failure to engage in Gaza since the end of
the five-year period constitutes a relinquishment of any criminal
jurisdiction over the territory. 200 This argument is rather weak
because the actions of the parties since the end of the five-year
period suggest their understanding that the Accords have not lapsed,
and that the agreement is being continued on an ad hoc basis. It does
not appear that the Accords have lapsed, so we turn next to the
question of capacity.
Whether or not the PNA has the capacity to accede to the ICC
depends on whether a state's accession to the Rome Statute is better
characterized as an act of foreign relations or as a judicial capacity
building measure. Under the Accords, only the PLO, not the PNA,
has competence over foreign relations.2 01 The PNA is specifically
competent, however, to establish and operate a judiciary and police
force.202 Accession to the Rome Statute or acceptance of jurisdiction
is arguably more comparable to a judicial function than a foreign
relations function, such as the establishment of a diplomatic mission,
and thus better classified as an exercise of the PNA's judicial power.
In fact, the PNA has already exchanged letters with the European
Union to form an EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories
199. Oslo Accords, supra note 36, arts. I, V(1).
200. See REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT FACT FINDING COMMITTEE ON GAZA: No
SAFE PLACE, supra note 8, para. 601 (pointing out that Israel has also designated
the Gaza Strip as a "hostile entity"); see also GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE OSLO
ACCORDS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE
AGREEMENTS 246-50 (2000) (describing Israeli and Palestinian compliance with
the Oslo Accords and Interim Agreements and noting that Israel has permitted the
Palestinian Police force to grow beyond the limits set forth in the Interim
Agreement).
201. See Interim Agreement, supra note 37, art. IX(5)(b); see also Case C-
386/08, Brita GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Mahburg-Hafen 2010 E.C.R., T 44-53
(recognizing the PLO's capacity to enter into the EC-PLO Agreement regarding
trade and customs between Europe and Palestine).
202. See Oslo Accords, supra note 36, arts. VII(2), VIII, IX.
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and open the European Union Coordinating Office for Palestinian
Police Support. 203 This act was not viewed as a violation of the
Accords. Although a PNA accession or acceptance of jurisdiction
involves an international organization, this act is substantively a
means of adjudicating certain international crimes that the PNA is
unable or unwilling to prosecute itself. A state's self-referral to the
ICC, based on its own assessment that it is unable to prosecute those
responsible, seems to exemplify a judicial capacity building measure.
But even if accession to the Rome Statute does not fall within the
PNA's power to establish a judiciary, under the Accords, the PLO
still retains a wide-ranging competence to engage in foreign relations
and could apply for the accession of Palestine if the PNA
communication fails.20 Still, in any event, there is a good argument
that accession to the ICC falls within the powers of the PNA as
agreed under the Oslo Accords.
The conclusion is also the same if the PNA merely accepts the
jurisdiction of the ICC, rather than accedes to the Rome Statute. The
PNA has competence to establish and operate a judiciary-that is, it
has adjudicative jurisdiction over the territory. Under the Accords,
Israel has only exempted from the PNA's competence responsibility
"for external security, and for internal security and public order of
settlements and Israelis."2 05 While some argue that this means that
Israel retains sole judicial authority of its own citizens in Gaza,2 06 this
"responsibility" exemption could also be read narrowly to mean that
203. See Council Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP, 2005 O.J. (L 300) 65, pmbl.
3-6.
204. Interim Agreement, supra note 37, art. IX(5)(b).
205. See Oslo Accords, supra note 36, at Agreed Minutes, Annex II; see also id.
art. IV ("Jurisdiction of the [PNA] will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory,
except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The
two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose
integrity will be preserved during the interim period."). Although the Accords, in
principle, established a territorial jurisdictional regime, they did not specify exactly
which parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip territories are covered or how they
are exempted from jurisdiction.
206. See Davenport Communication, supra note 32, at 4-5 (contending that the
Interim Agreement prohibits the Palestinian Authority's exercise of criminal
jurisdiction over citizens of Israel "including those who are in the West Bank and
Gaza," and further arguing that the Palestinian authority cannot transfer
jurisdiction to the ICC which when it does not itself possess this jurisdiction in its
domestic courts).
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Israel will provide security and policing for settlements and
Israelis.207 In the latter case, the PNA would not be prohibited from
exercising adjudicative authority over Israelis. 208 Even if the PNA
does not have adjudicative authority over Israelis under the Oslo
Accords, we could interpret that provision as a "constitutional"
limitation on the PNA as a government that might not necessarily
apply to the ICC.
The capacity of an international legal person to accede to the
Rome Statute has been addressed by the French Constitutional
Council in a slightly different context. In Re Treaty Establishing the
International Criminal Court,20 9 the Council determined that Article
27 of the Rome Statute, which provided that official immunity was
not a bar to prosecution, conflicted with Article 68 of the French
Constitution, which granted the President of the French Republic
immunity from prosecution "for acts performed in the exercise of his
functions." 2 10 The same objection was claimed for the immunity
provided to members of the French Parliament, who are immune for
"opinions or votes expressed in the exercise of their functions" under
Article 26 of the French Constitution. 2 1 1 The Constitutional Council
concluded that this conflict would bar France from acceding to the
Rome Statute. Subsequently, the French Parliament amended the
207. The argument that Israel retains sole jurisdiction over its citizens in Gaza
presumes a conclusive legal interpretation of the term "responsible" and introduces
terms such as "retained" which are not present in the Oslo Accords. It also
overlooks the fact that Israel has previously argued that it does not have
jurisdiction in the West Bank and Gaza. See, e.g., UN Econ. & Social Council,
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights: Second Periodic Reports Submitted by States under Articles 16 and 17 of
the Covenant, T 5,6, UN Doc. E/1990/6/Add.32 intro (Oct. 16 2001); UN
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Concluding Observations of
the Human Rights Committee: Israel, I 11, UN Doc. CO/78/ISR (Aug. 21, 2003);
208. There are anecdotal reports of PNA police arresting and otherwise
exercising jurisdiction over Israelis, though these cases appear to feature Israelis of
Arab ethnicity primarily. Israeli does not appear to have contested these exercises.
Substantiating information on this matter is, however, unavailable as criminal
matters under the PNA are protected by confidentiality requirements.
209. See Re Treaty Establishing the International Criminal Court, Dec. No. 98-
408 DC, para. 16 (Const. Council, Fr., Jan. 22, 1999), reprinted in 1999 REVUE
GENERAL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC [GEN. REV. PUB. INT'L L.] 464 [Fr.],
translated in 125 I.L.R. 475 (1999) ("pour les actes accomplis dans 1'exercice de
sesfonctions").
210. Id. para. 16 ("pour les actes accomplis dans I'exercice de ses fonctions").
211. See id ("opinions ou votes emis dans l'exercice de leursfonctions").
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French Constitution to permit it to join the ICC.2 12
The fact that the Constitutional Council found a conflict between
these provisions suggests that the Council believes that violations of
international criminal law could constitute official acts of the
President. This conclusion contradicts well-established case law in
the United Kingdom. In Pinochet,213 the House of Lords held that the
crime of torture, as provided in the Torture Convention, was not part
of the Chilean dictator Pinochet's executive duties.214 As far as this
author is aware, France signed and ratified the Torture Convention in
1986 without constitutional objection. 21 If we agree that the
Pinochet holding is a correct statement of law, then the French
Constitutional Council was simply incorrect.
This constitutional issue in France might suggest that Palestine
does not have the capacity to accede to the Rome Statute or at least
accept its jurisdiction if it does not have "constitutional" capacity to
do so-that is, capacity under the Oslo Accords. But, this is simply
not the case. The impediment in the French case was the
constitutional allocation of jurisdictional competence over the
President and members of Parliament and was a limitation on the
powers of the judiciary, not the inherent inability of the French State
to prosecute violations of the law. 216 The fact that the French
Parliament easily amended the French Constitution to provide for
accession shows that it clearly has that power. At the end of the day,
the conflict, if there was one, was entirely municipal. Accession to
the Rome Statute would have placed France in the untenable position
of overriding and granting immunities at the same time. As far as
international law was concerned, though, once France adhered to the
Rome Statute, it was bound regardless of its internal legal
212. See Loi constitutionnelle de modernisation des institutions de la V&
R6publique [Constitutional Law on the Modernization of the Institutions of the
Fifth Republic], Law No. 78 -2009/2, J. Off. No. 171 (July 24, 2008).
213. Regina v. Bow Street Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet
Ugarte, [1999] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.) (U.K.).
214. See id. at 205.
215. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 UNT.S. 85 (reserving that it shall
not be bound by paragraph 1 of Article 30).
216. See Re Treaty Establishing the International Criminal Court, supra note
209, para. 16.
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provisions.2 17 If France had interpreted its constitution in a manner
similar to U.K. courts in Pinochet, so that an amendment would not
have been required, then the ICC would not enquire into the correct
interpretation of French competence to join the ICC. If Palestine is a
quasi-state with the right to self-determination, and is thus accepted
as a "state" at least for the purposes of acceding to the Rome Statute
or otherwise accepting the jurisdiction of the ICC, then there is no
impediment under international law, and municipal law is beside the
point.
It does not necessarily follow that the PNA's jurisdictional
limitations would similarly constrain the ICC. The States Parties to
the Rome Statute and other states that accept the ICC's jurisdiction
are accepting the jurisdiction of the Court. Although the "transfer" or
"delegation" of jurisdiction by the state to the ICC is the paradigm
most often used to describe the complementary relationship between
the ICC and its States Parties,2 18 that particular language is not
present in the Rome Statute. Contrary to the theory that powers are
attributed to an international organization through delegation or
transfer, international organizations also can be said to have certain
inherent powers and competencies, usually based on the
organization's functions.2 19 Often, these inherent competencies are
limited to treaty making, legation, and maintaining international
disputes, but international law does not restrict them to these areas.22 0
217. Vienna Convention, supra note 167, art. 27 ("A party may not invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.").
218. See, e.g., THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY 609 (Antonio Cassesse ed., 2002) ("[T]here is no rule of
international law prohibiting the territorial State from voluntarily delegating to a
new collective judicial mechanism as the ICC its sovereign authority to persecute
perpetrators of [international crimes].").
219. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 12(3) (permitting non-State Parties to
allow the Court to exercise its jurisdiction over them). See generally DAN
SAROOSHI, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGN
POWERS 54-107 (2005) (discussing paradigms for characterizing the power sharing
relationship between international organizations and states other than delegation
and attribution); FINN SEYERSTED, OBJECTIVE INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY OF
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 28-30 (1964) (arguing that organizations
have inherent powers to accomplish their objectives, aside from those powers
expressly prohibited by their constitutive instruments).
220. See SEYERSTED, supra note 219, at 28 (noting that international
organizations do not lack legal capacity to perform the full range of international
acts performed by states; rather, organizations do not have the "practical need" to
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One question relevant to this situation is whether a purely judicial
international legal person has an inherent jurisdictional capacity that
states merely accept.2 2 1 One possible example of the ICC's inherent
jurisdiction is in regards to head of state immunities. If states merely
transfer their jurisdiction to the ICC, then the Court could never hear
the case of any serving head of state because states cannot have
jurisdiction over a person enjoying state immunity.22 2 Clearly the
states of the world were able to bring into existence an entity that
would have jurisdiction over serving heads of state, despite the fact
that they themselves did not have that capacity. 223 Indeed, arguing
perform many international acts because they lack territory and nationals).
221. But cf Rend Uruena, The World Trade Organization and Its Powers to
Adopt a Competition Policy, 3 INT'L ORGS. L. REv. 55, 81-83 (2006) (pointing out
the logical contradictions inherent in the inherent powers doctrine and arguing the
doctrine does not justify the WTO's position that it has the power to "address
anticompetitive practices that do not hinder market access").
222. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) 2002
1.C.J. 3, 58-61 (Feb. 14) (reviewing the rules of international criminal tribunals
on immunity and criminal responsibility of persons acting within an official
capacity and concluding that "an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs
may be subject to criminal proceedings before certain international criminal courts,
where they have jurisdiction," including the future International Criminal Court).
Any incapacity on the part of the ICC is likely limited to heads of state from states
not parties to the Rome Statute since the states parties to the Rome Statute have
arguably modified customary international law regarding head of state immunity in
their relations among themselves. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 27.
However, the modification of customary international law regarding head of state
immunity in the Rome Statute was only for the purposes of the Rome Statute and
not for the purpose of surrender to another State Party or any other action when not
under a binding obligation from the ICC to do so.
223. See, e.g., Paola Gaeta, Does President Al Bashar Enjoy Immunity from
Arrest?, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 315, 332 (2009) (arguing that if a state party to the
ICC arrested Sudanese leader Al Bashir, the arrest would be unlawful because it
would violate his head of state immunity, but also asserting that such an unlawful
arrest would not affect the ICC's jurisdiction because the ICC need not respect
head of state immunities). Although arguments have been made that the Rome
Statute could be characterized as a collective waiver of immunity amongst the
various States Parties, these arguments are ultimately unconvincing. For one, the
language used by the International Court of Justice in the Arrest Warrant case did
not reflect the collective waiver argument; rather, it suggested that there is
something unique to international tribunals that allows them to disregard the head
of state immunity doctrine. This approach was applied in practice in the Charles
Taylor case. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT, Prosecution's
Second Amended Indictment (May 29, 2007) (holding Taylor individually
criminally responsible for the crimes charged). Further, if the collective waiver
argument bears weight, it will be difficult for the ICC or any international tribunal
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that the ICC must examine each state's municipal jurisdiction
provisions and condition the application of the Rome Statute to the
state's municipal situation is an untenable position. The jurisdictional
transfer paradigm does not fully capture the relationship between the
ICC and the States Parties, and that convenient expression should not
prejudice the relationship by suggesting that the ICC is strictly
limited to exercising the particular jurisdictional competence of the
state's judiciary.
Provided that the PNA has sufficient capacity to accede to the
Rome Statute as a treaty, or otherwise accept the Court's jurisdiction,
the PNA is recognized as an international legal person for that
purpose and the ICC may then apply its own jurisdictional,
competence, and admissibility requirements as provided in the Rome
Statute. To date, neither the Defense, Prosecution, nor the ICC bench
have ever raised questions about the jurisdictional provisions of the
states in which allegedly criminal acts took place-at least as a limit
on the provisions of the Rome Statute. In fact, the PNA's
jurisdictional limitations might be the very reason that it is "unable"
to prosecute certain crimes over which the ICC could have
jurisdiction, thus rendering the case admissible before the Court.
B. CAPACITY TO ACT REGARDLESS OF THE OSLO ACCORDS
A second consideration is whether Palestine, as a nation with the
right to self-determination, needs authorization under the Accords to
accede to the Rome Statute or accept the jurisdiction of the Court. If
Palestine is acknowledged as a state, it would not need any other
state's permission to accede to a treaty regardless of whether Israel
considers Palestine a state. However, if Palestine falls into a quasi-
state status, then its situation is less clear. Given that Palestine is
widely regarded as a people with a right to self-determination, then
the people may have an inherent competence to accede to any
treaty. 224 As discussed above, the PLO, as the generally
to prosecute heads of state when the state has not expressly waived its immunity by
acceding to the Rome Statute. This was the case in Al Bashir which was referred to
the ICC by the UN Security Council. See Prosec. v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09,
Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Mar. 4, 2009). If the collective waiver argument holds,
then the case against Al Bashir cannot go forward.
224. As a people with the right to self-determination and the international duty
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acknowledged international representative of the people, has been
accorded the privilege of concluding international agreements. The
difficulty here, however, is that the PNA Minister, not a PLO
representative, communicated the acceptance of the Rome Statute to
the ICC. Additionally, the communication to the ICC was
purportedly from the "Government of Palestine," not the PNA.2 25
Although the Registrar understood the communication to be
submitted by the PNA, and the PNA Justice Minister did not appear
to protest that understanding, the Registrar's preliminary
understanding or misunderstanding would not necessarily control. If
it was the PLO and not the PNA that submitted the communication,
this action would not be limited by the PNA's competence under the
Oslo Accords.
Yet, if the communication was conclusively determined to have
been submitted by the PNA, there does not appear to be a
requirement that the ICC regard the PLO as the sole international
representative of the Palestinian people. The relationship between the
PLO and PNA, both exercising certain authority of the Palestinian
people, might justify overlooking the structural formalities to
consider the substantive matter at issue: the people of Palestine have
accepted the ICC's jurisdiction through their representatives.2 26 The
PNA's application to accede to the Rome Statute might be ultra vires
vis-d-vis the Oslo Accords, and any PLO intent to accede that uses
the PNA as a communication vehicle might similarly violate its
undertaking in the Accords not to exercise such competence. 227
to extradite or prosecute violations of international criminal law, the people of
Palestine arguably cannot release themselves from this duty. Thus, Palestine
retains authority to prosecute any person in its territory for violations of
international criminal law, even if it has delegated away authority to prosecute for
other minor crimes. See, e.g., Kearney & Denayer, supra note 38, if 33-34..
225. See Palestinian Declaration, supra note 1.
226. In fact, it appears that the formal distinctions between PLO and PNA
competencies are already being "blurred in practice." See, e.g., Kearney &
Denayer, supra note 38, 26 (noting that the PNA has entered into agreements
with international organizations and the PLO concluded a security agreement, but
signed as the PNA). None of these blurred practices appear to have been protested.
227. See Wye River Memorandum, supra note 37, § V ("Recognizing the
necessity to create a positive environment for the negotiations, neither side shall
initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip in accordance with the Interim Agreement."). The determination that either
PNA accession to the Rome Statute or the PLO's encouragement of the PNA's
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However, Israel's unwillingness to authorize the accession does not
necessarily deprive the people of Palestine of their inherent capacity
to accede.
Even if the PNA was exceeding its authority in acceding to the
Rome Statute or accepting the Court's jurisdiction, that fact would
not, by itself, necessarily be grounds for the ICC to refuse to act. The
Vienna Convention provides:
A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty
has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding
competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that
violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of
fundamental importance. 228
It then clarifies that "[a] violation is manifest if it would be
objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in
accordance with normal practice and in good faith."229 First, the
Vienna Convention only provides the acceding state with a ground to
object to its accession, not a right of third-party states to intervene
and object. Similarly, the Convention does not confer upon a treaty
organization-like the ICC-the option to object. In the case of
Palestine, therefore, Israel does not have grounds to assert that the
PNA is not competent, nor does any other state. Similarly, the ICC
would not have a basis in the Vienna Convention to refuse on that
ground.
Even if the ICC or a third-party state could object on this ground,
the objecting party would have the onus of showing that the PNA
manifestly lacks competence and that its actions have violated a rule
of fundamental importance to Palestine. This would be an impossible
argument to make if Palestine merely asserts that the Oslo Accords
accession violated the Accords would necessitate a preliminary finding that the
accession or acceptance of ICC jurisdiction changed "the status of the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip." Further, Israel would also need to determine whether such an
act changed the status of the territory in a manner significant enough to constitute a
material breach of the Accords. This would permit Israel to denounce the Accords,
and would likely result in Israel's revocation of the PNA's right to exist. However,
the power of states to terminate a treaty for material breach is, in turn, constrained
when the termination would affect the human rights of the individuals benefiting
from the treaty.
228. Vienna Convention, supra note 167, art. 46(1).
229. Id. art. 46(2).
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are not of fundamental importance. Given the arguments above
regarding inherent self-determination and the relationships between
the PNA, PLO, and Palestinian people, the PNA's competence may
be unclear, but such issues are not necessarily manifest and
fundamental to Palestine.
Some have argued that the Palestinian declaration is invalid
because of Hamas' refusal to accept the authority of the PNA in
Gaza.23 0 The fact that a portion of a state or a rebel group, or similar
rebellious region, does not accept the authority of the central
government of a state (or quasi-state) does not mean that the
government lacks the legal authority to act for the entirety of the
state (or quasi-state) internationally. Not only has Israel recognized
the PNA as the authority acting internally and the PLO as the
authority acting internationally, for the entirety of the territory of the
West Bank and Gaza, but so have all of the organizations that
Palestine has joined or at which it has been seated as an observer.23 '
Since Gaza appears to be recognized as a part of the entity of
Palestine, the Fatah-led government in the West Bank would be the
only authority competent to act for the Gaza territory internally, and
the PLO remains competent to act for the entire Palestinian people
internationally. This argument loses even more support following the
creation of the unity government between Hamas and Fatah.
Based on the above, the PNA is arguably authorized under the
Oslo Accords and has the capacity to accede to a judicial treaty such
as the Rome Statute or otherwise accept the adjudicative jurisdiction
of the ICC. Moreover, under its right to self-determination, Palestine
(possibly through the PNA and certainly through the PLO) is
inherently competent to accede to any treaty or treaty organization
that will recognize it as having that capacity. If it is true that the
230. See, e.g., Davenport Communication, supra note 32, at 9-10.
231. See Vienna Convention, supra note 167, art. 29 ("Unless a different
intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, a treaty is binding
upon each party in respect of its entire territory."). In addition, the Hamas-led
government in Gaza has accepted the Basic Law promulgated by the Fatah-led
PNA for the entirety of the Palestinian territory, and has even asserted its own
legitimacy as a government under the PNA Basic Law. See Errol Mendes,
Statehood and Palestine for the Purposes of Article 12(3) of the ICC Statute: A
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PNA's accession to the Rome Statute is a judicial act, then the
PNA's acts would not be ultra vires under the Oslo Accords. If, on
the other hand, accession is not a judicial act, then it might be
beyond the scope of the Accords. However, even if the act could be
considered ultra vires under the Oslo Accords, the violation would
not necessarily deprive the PNA's acts of all legal force. 232
Therefore, Palestine has the capacity to accede to the Rome Statute
or otherwise accept the jurisdiction of the ICC, arguably through any
of its various personalities of the people of Palestine, the PLO, or the
PNA.
IV. FORM OF ACCESSION
While this article ultimately concludes that Palestine may join the
ICC or accept its jurisdiction, there is no reason to assume that
Palestine must be afforded the same rights as other State Parties. On
the contrary, there are a variety of limited forms of membership that
might be suitable. For example, some organizations that accept non-
state entities as members do not permit full voting rights to non-
independent states because of their status.233 In the period in which
the "micro-state" problem was being debated at the United Nations,
there were proposals that miniscule states might be admitted with
special conditions, such as reduced voting rights or other limitations
on their participation rights. 234 These proposals were ultimately
rejected, but the rejection appears to have been for political reasons
(a failure to amend the Charter to provide for differing forms of
membership), not because there was any international legal obstacle
to conditional membership.235 Palestine could be admitted to the ICC,
though its participation rights in the Assembly of States Parties
232. Cf Competence of the International Labour Organization in Regard to
Examination of Proposals for the Organization and Development of the Methods
of Agricultural Production, Advisory Opinion, 1922 P.C.I.J (ser. B) No. 3, § 18
(Aug. 12) (finding that the International Labour Organization "cannot be excluded
from dealing with the matters specifically committed to it by treaty on the ground
that this may involve . . . consideration of [matters the Organization should have
considered prior to concluding the treaty]").
233. See, e.g., Convention of the World Meteorological Organization, supra
note 144, art. 11(a)..
234. See generally DUURSMA, supra note 43, at 135-37 (discussing observer
status and associate membership as possible solutions to the question of micro-
state participation at the United Nations).
235. See, e.g., id. at 138.
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("ASP") might be limited in some way. It might also be possible to
limit Palestine's ability to refer situations occurring in other states to
the ICC.
Unfortunately, at this point in time, the Rome Statute does not
provide for these possibilities. To accommodate a limited form of
membership, the Statute would most likely need to be amended,
unless it was informally amended by practice accepted by the
membership.2 3 6 A final possibility is that Palestine could be admitted
as an observer over which the ICC might even exercise
complementary adjudicative jurisdiction, but which could not
participate.in the organization's political processes. The creation of
an observer category could be an inherent power of an international
organization, possibly even without enabling language in the
organization's constitutive instrument. This is exemplified by the
consistent practice of international organizations admitting
observers, and the fact that the Rome Statute might be implicitly
amended through the practice of admitting observers. In any event,
Palestinian accession to the Rome Statute might not require that it
join in the same membership category as other States Parties.
V. EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION
As noted above, the ICC may only assert its jurisdiction in one of
three situations: referral by a State Party, referral by the UN Security
Council, or when the ICC Prosecutor investigates on his own
initiative.237 Both Saudi Arabia and Yemen, though neither State
Parties to the Rome Statute or permanent members of the UN
Security Council, have nonetheless expressed a desire to refer the
situation in Gaza to the Court. 23 8 Alternatively, the "self-referral" of a
State Party to the Rome Statute has been accepted in practice where
the referring state would be the locus for the investigation. 239
236. See Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J.
151, 168 (July 20); Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a
State to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 4 (Mar. 3).
237. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 13-15.
238. See Saudi Likens Gaza Assault to Nazi War Crimes, AM. FREE PRESS, Mar.
2, 2008, available at http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5ixB0uFAPL
FVTGSnGROKp4jelEljQ.
239. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The ICC - Quo Vadis?, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
421, 424-25 (2006) (highlighting the first two self-referrals to the ICC, northern
Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo) See generally Mohamed M. El
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However, this alternative would require that Palestine be a party to
the Rome Statute, not merely that it have accepted the Court's
jurisdiction. Self-referral would also require that Palestine not have
been admitted as a special case member under an amended Rome
Statute membership category that raises institutional limitations on
lodging referrals, should such a category be created. If so, it would
seem odd that a special case member could not refer itself, at a
minimum. Finally, the Prosecutor could also start an investigation in
Palestine "proprio motu"--on his own initiative. As of yet, the
Prosecutor has never exercised his power in this fashion, but he is
certainly not precluded from doing so. In sum, one of these actions
must be taken in order to "trigger" the ICC's jurisdiction.
The necessary protocol for triggering the Court's jurisdiction is
somewhat less clear where an entity has merely accepted the Court's
jurisdiction rather than acceded to the Statute wholesale. 240 This
paper will not take a position in this debate, but will proceed with the
assumption that the Court's jurisdiction must be additionally
triggered in the same fashion as it must for a State Party, simply to
ensure a complete discussion. In this analysis, the self-referral option
would be unavailable because Palestine would not be a State Party to
the Rome Statute. Therefore, either another state that is party to the
Rome Statute or the Security Council would need to refer the Gaza
situation to the ICC, or the Prosecutor would need to take the
initiative on his own accord.
As mentioned above, in order for a case to be admissible to the
ICC, a state with jurisdiction must either be unwilling or unable to
genuinely investigate or prosecute the alleged crime.2 4 1 If the Court
had jurisdiction through the initiative of Palestine, either because it
accepted the ICC's jurisdiction and another State Party referred the
situation in Gaza, or because Palestine referred itself though not a
State Party, we can presume that this condition would be satisfied.
Zeidy, The Ugandan Government Triggers the First Test of the Complementarity
Principle: An Assessment of the First State's Party Referral to the ICC, 5 INT'L
CRIM. L. REV. 83, 99-105 (2005) (describing how the principle of complementarity
applies in the situation of Uganda's self-referral to the ICC).
240. See Freeland, supra note 174, at 217.
241. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17(1)(a)-(b) (determining that cases are
inadmissible if a state with jurisdiction over a case is investigating or prosecuting it
or has decided not to investigate or prosecute the case).
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Similar analyses for pending situations of self-referral. currently
before the Court have reached the same conclusion.2 42 Palestine
could block the admissibility of a case at any point by genuinely
investigating and prosecuting the situation itself. Given its relations
with Israel and the PNA's historic relations with Hamas, however,
Palestine likely accepted the Court's jurisdiction because it could not
exercise such jurisdiction in Gaza. Israel, on the other hand, could
also block a case by genuinely investigating and prosecuting the
situation. Because the alleged violations occurred within the
hierarchical and accountable IDF, Israel's option to block the
admissibility of a case is a real possibility and a welcome one-if it
is genuine. The sad reality is that, politically speaking, even a
thorough investigation and prosecution by Israel might not be
perceived as legitimate. 24 3 The Court would need to wade into the
treacherous waters of determining the genuine quality of such an
investigation and prosecution, but, that is one subject for another
discussion.
CONCLUSION
This article argues that there is no barrier under international law
for Palestine to accede to the Rome Statute or accept the jurisdiction
of the ICC, and that the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over the
situation in Gaza, or any other situation in the Palestinian territories
or involving "nationals" of Palestine.
The Rome Statute limits membership and acceptances of
jurisdiction to "states." Although there is an argument that Palestine
satisfies the conditions for statehood under the declaratory and
constitutive theories, the criteria are not fully or clearly met.
Nevertheless, because Palestine satisfies the conditions, at least in
242. See, e.g., El Zeidy, supra note 239, at 111-19 (discussing whether Uganda,
which self-referred to the ICC's jurisdiction, has competence to investigate and
prosecute alleged crimes by the Lord Resistance Army).
243. See, e.g., Isabel Kershner, Israel Rebukes 2 for UN Gaza Compound
Shelling, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/0202/world/
middleeast/02mideast.html (reporting that Israel reprimanded military officers for
their use of white phosphorous, but also that Israel has been accused of "covering
up details of the shelling of the [UN] compound); Israel: Military Investigations
Fail Gaza War Victims, supra note 13 ("Israel has failed to demonstrate that it will
conduct thorough and impartial investigations into alleged laws-of-war violations
by its forces during last year's Gaza conflict.").
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part, Palestine may qualify as a quasi-state, with some aspects of
statehood for some purposes. This article argues that those purposes
include both accession to the Rome Statute and acceptance of the
ICC's jurisdiction.
Palestine, through its personalities of the PNA, the PLO, and the
Palestinian people, has the capacity to accede to the Rome Statute
and/or accept the ICC's jurisdiction. The Oslo Accords limited the
PNA's authority to engage in foreign relations, but the PLO remains
free to act internationally. Also, the authority granted to the PNA
includes the competence to establish a judiciary and police force,
which arguably includes the right to accede to an international
judiciary or otherwise delegate its adjudicative jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the Palestinian people still hold the right to self-
determination. On that basis, the Palestinian people may derive the
right to accede to any treaty, regardless of the demands of its
neighboring people. Thus, even if the Oslo Accords limit the
authorization of the PNA to accede to an international treaty, the
Accords would not restrict Palestine's inherent capacity to enter
treaties, though doing so might violate its agreement with Israel that
it would not act internationally.
Although the text of the Rome Statute appears to limit
membership to "states," the practice of international organizations is
that that term "state" may be used liberally to include quasi-states
with some degree of tatehood, notwithstanding the clear language of
the text. There is no requirement of international law that the term be
interpreted restrictively. In fact, the ICC has already admitted one
quasi-state-the Cook Islands-to membership. There is also no
obligation under international law that only states be admitted as
members of international organizations, generally, or that only states
participate in the work of international organizations. Thus, there is
no barrier under international law to Palestinian accession to the
Rome Statute or acceptance of the ICC's jurisdiction. That does not
mean, however, that Palestine must necessarily join with the same
status as other States Parties. International law would permit the ICC
to limit Palestine's voting rights or even to invent a form of observer
status that reflects Palestine's status as a quasi-state.
Finally, if the ICC acquired complementary jurisdiction over
Palestinian territory and "nationals," and accepted referral of the
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situation in Gaza, that referral would not mean that the ICC would be
limited to investigating only the attacks on Palestinians by the IDF.
Instead, the referral and jurisdiction over the situation should be
interpreted to include the actions of Palestinians in Gaza-
specifically, the acts of the Hamas-led government in Gaza. Hamas
has been accused of committing serious war crimes, such as
launching more than six thousand mortar attacks targeting civilians
and otherwise failing to make any distinction between civilians and
legitimate combatants. 244 It may also be responsible for acts of
genocide.245 The accession of Palestine to the ICC should not add to
the problems in the region by resulting in a one-sided prosecution
policy by the ICC, as that would contravene its mandate.
Based on the above, Palestine may join the ICC or, in the
alternative, accept the Court's jurisdiction. The ICC will need to
examine whether it will recognize Palestine as a state or whether the
object and purpose of the Rome Statute permits a liberal
interpretation of the term "state," as it appeared to do with the Cook
Islands. Therefore, if the ICC ultimately concludes that Palestine
may not accede to the Rome Statute or that the ICC cannot otherwise
exercise its jurisdiction over the territory and "nationals," it will be
because political concerns are perceived by the ICC as significant
enough to justify a conservative approach, not because international
law demands it.
244. See Goldstone Report, supra note 8, at 41-42; see also Diaa Hadid,
Rights Group: Hamas May Have Committed War Crimes, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 6,
2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2009607824-apmlpalesti
nianswarcrimes.html; Simons, supra note 6 (noting allegations that Hamas targeted
civilian areas without any distinction between civilian and military objects and
used civilians as human shields).
245. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide art. 2, Dec. 9 1948, S. Exec. Doc. 0, 81-1 (1949), 78 U.N.T.S. 277
(entered into force Jan. 12, 1951); The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance
Movement (Hamas Covenant) pmbl., art. 7, Aug. 18, 1988, available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th century/hamas.asp ("Our struggle against the Jews
is very great and very serious. It needs all sincere efforts. It is a step that inevitably
should be followed by other steps. The Movement is but one squadron that should
be supported by more and more squadrons from this vast Arab and Islamic world,
until the enemy is vanquished and Allah's victory is realized."). It would appear
that Hamas operatives are engaging in acts prohibited under Article 2 of the
Genocide Convention against Jews with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
their protected group.
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